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Efforts of target directors and officers to resist change of control
by tender offer, including the payment of substantial premiums
above market ("greenmail") to the bidder - which are not avail-
able to other shareholders - in a mere effort to retain corporate
control by incumbent directors and officers are an egregious breach
of fiduciary duties and should be evaluated by a standard which
reflects the status of these target directors and officers as corporate
fiduciaries and not by the business judgment rule.
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INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of achieving takeovers of publicly held cor-
porations through use of the tender offer' has become one of the
most controversial aspects of corporate management in the Unit-
ed States. Since 1982, the total value of acquisitions has ranged
from $38.4 billion to $94.6 billion, including the acquisition of
RCA by General Electric in 1986, oil company combinations in
1984 whereby Chevron and Texaco purchased Gulf and Getty,
respectively, and the purchase of Bendix by Allied in 19822 The
sheer size of the offerings and resulting mergers, and the high
profile media campaigns waged during tender offers have sparked
public debate and calls for federal legislation,' as well as critical
1. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 822-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affid, 682 F.2d 355 (2d
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983). Although "tender offer" is not defined in the Williams Act
amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 781 - 78n (1982) [hereinafter
cited as the "Williams Act"], the Wellman court adopted seven elements suggested by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission that characterize a tender offer:
(1) active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for the shares of an issuer; (2)
solicitation made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock; (3) offer to purchase made
at a premium over the prevailing market price; (4) terms of the offer are firm rather than
negotiable; (5) offer contingent on the tender of a fixed number of shares, often subject to
a fixed maximum number to be purchased; (6) offer open only a limited period of time; (7)
offeree subjected to pressure to sell his stock.
Id.
Note, The Elusive Definition of a Tender Offer, 7 J. of Corp. L. 503 -24 (Spring 1982). Cf Greene and Junewicz,
A Reappraisal or Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 647 (1984) ("It is only
when large-scale purchase programs have been accompanied by active and widespread solicitation or pressure
on shareholders to accept or reject the offer quickly that courts have been willing to conclude that the transac-
tions constitute tender offers"). Id. at 663; Williams, Tender Offers and the Corporate Directors, [1979-1980
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 82,445 at 82,876 (Jan. 17, 1980).
The first, and perhaps most unsettling, aspect of the current wave of mergers and acquisitions
is the legitimacy which hostile tender offers have come to enjoy. It has become acceptable
to treat corporations as the sum of their properties and to assume that corporate control may
change hands with no greater concern about the consequences that accompanies an exchange
of property deeds in a game of Monopoly. But, a corporation is more than the aggregate of
its tangible assets - and more than the equity of its current shareholders - it is an institution
with a complex of interpersonal and contractual relationships that create legitimate interests
in the corporation among employees, suppliers, customers, communities, and the economy
at large.
Id.
2. Weiner, Deals of the Year, FORTUNE 68 (Feb. 2, 1987) (for 1986, "the total value of corporate com-
binations, securities issues, and buy-backs on Fortune's list - $92.6 billion is just under the 1985 total," includ-
ing General Electric's $6.4 billion acquisition of RCA in the largest non-oil transaction ever); Kirkpatrick,
Deals of the Year, FORTUNE 26 (Jan. 20, 1986) (in 1985, "the total value of completed deals on Fortune's
list of the 50 biggest corporate combinations and securities offerings is $94.6 billion, a 20% increase over
1984"); Steinbreden, Deals of the Year, FORTUNE 126 (Jan. 21, 1985) (in 1984, "the value of acquisitions in
U.S. corporate history - Chevron's purchase of Gulf and Texaco's of Getty" at $13.2 billion and $10.1 billion
respectively); Wiener, Deals of the Year, FORTUNE 54 (Jan. 23, 1984) (total value in 1983 of $38.4 billion,
where compared to 1982 the number of offerings increased from 17 to 30 and corporate linkings decreased
to 20 from 33); Steyer, Deals of the Year, FORTUNE 48 (Jan. 24, 1983) (the total value of corporate acquisi-
tions in 1982 was $48.2 billion, including the "four-comered fight among Bendix, Martin Marietta, Allied,
and United Technologies. The $1.8 billion that Allied paid for Bendix was the fourth-largest amount spent
on a single deal."). See Williams, supra note 1, at 82,877 (Former Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman
Harold M. Williams observed corporate cash resources expended in tender offers "could have been devoted
to new production and employment opportunities").
3. Steyer, supra note 2, at 48.
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assessments of expenditure of corporate resources in acquisition
of other corporations rather than needed investment in moder-
nizing physical plants and raising productivity.'
Management of corporations targeted for takeover have respond-
ed to the challenge for control by the tender offeror with a varie-
ty of measures, limited only by the scope of imagination, including
anti-takeover provisions in articles of incorporation and/or by-
laws;' increasing the cost to acquire the target through long term
and expensive employment contracts with current management;6
acquiring business entities that present anti-trust problems for the
acquiring corporation;7 and/or selling an asset that was the es-
sence of the target corporation's value to the acquiring corporation.'
Often the response of target management is to pay the bidder
a premium for its shares in exchange for withdrawal of an attempt-
ed tender offer. Greenmail, whereby the bidder "creates the threat
of a corporate takeover by purchasing a significant amount of the
company's stock [which is sold] back to the company at a premi-
um when its executives, in fear of their jobs, agree to buy him
out,"9 poses conflict of interest issues that reflect on whether the
board of directors, in authorizing repurchase of corporate stock
from a bidder at a premium unavailable to other shareholders,
has breached its fiduciary duties to the corporation and its remain-
ing shareholders.'0 Greenmail has been seen as a "destabilizing
force in the conduct of American business";" likewise, one of
4. Williams, supra note 1, at 82,877.
Inherent in the overall acquisition wave, exaggerated by the increasing use of hostile tender
offers, is a concern about the concentration of this nation's economic power, as well as the
appropriate use of corporate resources in a period of increasing international competition and
shrinking U.S. domination-when the United States has the highest percentage of obsolete plants,
and the lowest percentage of capital investment, growth in productivity and in savings of any
major industrialized society.
Id.
5. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
9. Heckman v. Ahmanson, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177, 180 n.l (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1985).
10. Greene and Junewicz, supra note 1, at 651-52. State statutes imposing fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty are the only limits to the board of directors' discretion. The authors observe not only were these statutes
not intended to regulate conduct during acquisition of control but they are also an ineffective limitation.
11. Rock, Greenmail: The Destabilizing of the American Corporation, 8 Dits. & BDS. 3 (Summer 1984).
Management's duty is value creation for all shareholders. That responsibility cannot be allowed to be taken
out of management's hands. To look for value creation in the market movements caused by greenmailer greed
is not healthy, is not credible, is not in the long-term interests of management/shareholder-run enterprises,
and is truly the road to the destabilization of American business. But see DeMott, Three Who Watch, Wait
and Strike, TIME 65 (Mar. 4, 1985).
One premise of the Icahn strategy is that large American finns are staffed with poor managers.
Says he: 'Unfortunately, many of today's chief executives have spent the first 20 or 30 years
of their business careers studying how to please their boards rather than concentrating on how
to increase their corporations' profitability. Top management in America, with many notable
exceptions, is sadly lacking in knowledge and leadership.'
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those so-called corporate raiders"2 who has been accused of green-
mail, is also critical of this use of corporate resources.
13
Although modern management theories and techniques may be
used to a greater extent in defining acceptable management be-
havior in the tender offer context, retention of a standard, based
on the concept of fiduciary duties of directors and officers to the
corporation and its shareholders, is essential to effectuated com-
pliance not only with technical requirements governing response
of management during a tender offer, but also with the underly-
ing policy of discouraging divided loyalties of directors and
officers.
Justice Cardozo, in Meinhard v. Salmon,'" set forth the duty
owed by those in a fiduciary relationship.
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbid-
den to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard
of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is bending and inveterate. Uncompromising
rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided
loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions."
Courts have interpreted the relationship of directors to the cor-
poration and its shareholders as a fiduciary one, requiring of direc-
tors undivided loyalty and allegiance.' The considerable discretion
of directors to manage the enterprise must not be used for per-
sonal advantage.' As a practical matter, the corporation has "a
12. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 28 (1977), reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1977) ('in-
dividuals [in] the financial community who . . . seize control of the corporation with unknown assets, and
later split up the remains among themselves"). Senator Kuchel, a co-sponsor of the Williams Act also describes
these individuals as "takeover pirates." Id.
13. 131 Cong. Rec. S673 at S674 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985) (statement of Mr. Riegel).
T. Boone Pickens, the president of Mesa Petroleum, wrote me September 12, 1984, that he
finds 'greenmail abhorrent and inconsistent with the concept of a free and open market. Green-
mail is the antithesis of fairness. A target company should not be able to repurchase its stock
at a premium from a dissident shareholder without offering the same price to all shareholders.'
Id.
But see Greenwald, supra note 2, at 54. "Oil industry executives are as tough on Pickens as he is on them.
'He's only after the almighty buck,' says G.C. Richardson, a retired executive of Cities Service. 'He's nothing
but a pirate.'" Id.
14. 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
15. Id. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546.
16. Kullgren v. Navy Gas & Supply Co., 110 Colo. 454, 461, 135 P.2d 1007, 1010 (1943) (directors
held to high standard of trustees).
17. Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
§ 95,863 at 91,137 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1976) (breach of fiduciary duty to engage in self-serving conduct
to "exclusion or detriment of . . . shareholders").
The court enjoined the acquisition finding it was attempted "solely to thwart Monogram's proposed tender
offer, . . .serve[d] no proper corporate purpose, is a waste of Royal's corporate assets, [and] is calculated
to serve the interest of Royal's Management to the exclusion or detriment of Royal shareholders." See also
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 273, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (doctrine of corporate opportunity)
("The rule that requires an undivided unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict
between duty and self-interest"). Id. at 91,138.
[Vol. 7:117
19871 FIDUCIARY DUTY IN TENDER OFFER DEFENSES 121
vital interest in seeing that its . . . directors act faithfully in ad-
ministering its affairs."is
The Supreme Court has also unequivocally imposed fiduciary
duties on corporate directors, as well as on a dominant or con-
trolling shareholder or group of shareholders. In Pepper v. Lit-
ton," the Court examined the basis on which a bankruptcy court
may disallow as a claim a judgment, obtained by the dominant
and controlling shareholder of the bankrupt corporation, on al-
leged salary claims. " Even though "a sufficient consideration may
be simply the violation of rules of fair play and good conscience,"21
one in a fiduciary relationship is held to a higher standard.
He who is in such a fiduciary position cannot serve himself first and his cestuis second .... He can-
not utilize his inside information and his strategic position for his own preferment.
He cannot use his power for his personal advantage and to the detriment of the stockholders and credi-
tors no matter how absolute in terms that power may be and no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy
technical requirements. For that power is at all times subject to the equitable limitation that it may
not be exercised for the aggrandizement, preference, or advantage of the fiduciary to the exclusion
or detriment of the cestuis."
In extending equitable relief to actions by corporate directors
and controlling shareholders that are a breach of fiduciary duty,
regardless of "how technically legal" 3 those actions may be, the
Court has appropriately rejected any suggestions that the doctrine
of independent legal significance" should be applicable in these
situations. Thus, corporate fiduciaries have been held to the highest
standards by the courts when the breach is obvious (e.g., involves
self-dealing), and it is posited that the fiduciary standard is equally
appropriate (and should be just as vigorously enforced) in the other
than obvious self-dealing inherent in defending against the tender
offer.
In determining the fiduciary duties of officers and members of
boards of directors of publicly held corporations in the context
of a change of control, this article will examine the impact of ju-
dicial deference via the business judgment rule on fiduciary duties,
18. Anderson v. Albert & J.M. Anderson Mfg. Co., 325 Mass. 343, 345, 90 N.E.2d 541, 543-44 (1950)
(breach of fiduciary duty for directors to use corporate position to "manipulate the issue and purchase" of the
corporation's stock to secure and perpetuate control of the corporation in themselves); see Schwartz v. Marien,
37 N.Y.2d 487, 490, 335 N.E.2d 334, 337 (1975) (corporate directors owe fiduciary duty to 'treat all share-
holders fairly and evenly").
19. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
20. Id. at 296.
21. Id. at 310.
22. Id. at 310-11.
23. Id. at 312.
24. Rothschild Int'l Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc., 474 A.2d 133 (Del. Supr. 1984) (preferential rights
subject to defeasance under merger statutes); Hariton v. Arco Elec., Inc., 40 Del. Ch. 326, 182 A.2d 22 (1962),
affd, 188 A.2d 123 (1963) (shareholder appraisal rights are granted only in a statutory merger).
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and the fiduciary duties of both target corporation and acquiring
corporation management. This article will conclude with proposed
fiduciary standards for directors, officers, and greenmail tender
offer shareholders (as "controlling" shareholders), and suggest an
appropriate role for federal regulation.
I. JUDICIALLY RECOGNIZED STANDARD OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
APPLIED TO CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS.
The duties of care and loyalty imposed on directors of corpo-
rations were based on the corresponding duties of the common
law trustee, generally as a result of the similarities in "separation
of beneficial interests from legal ownership and management of
assets."2 However, unlike beneficiaries of trusts, corporate share-
holders, through their power to elect management were seen to
need less judicial protection than the cestui que trust; and the fun-
damental nature of the business enterprise is management of risk
for profit. "6
Business judgment rule gives managers the freedom to err, and thus it facilities risk-taking. Perhaps
more fundamentally, it reflects the fact that error-prone managers eventually are 'selected out' by the
process of competition among firms and among managers .. .. It is better to insulate all honest deci-
sions from review than to expose managers and directors to review by judges and juries who do not
face market pressure."
Courts have been willing to protect the corporation and its share-
holders from breach of fiduciary duties where directors have en-
gaged in traditional forms of self-dealing,28 but where
non-traditional forms of self-dealing and conflict of interest by
directors and officers are present, courts cite the business judg-
ment rule29 and defer to management's decision. "Although the
25. Christy, Corporated Mismanagement as Malpractice: A Critical Reanalysis of Corporate Managers'
Duties of Care and Loyalty, 21 Hous. L. REV. 105, 122 (1984).
26. Id. at 171-72.
No fiduciary, whether trustee or a corporate manager, should be permitted to take unreasona-
ble risks. The only difference between the trust and business contexts lies in the appropriate
level of risk, which is higher for a business. The risk adverse business investor can protect
himself. Nevertheless, both managers and trustees should be responsible for identifying and
assessing risk factors and making reasonably certain that in light of the risk adverseness of
their beneficiaries the risks are justified by the potential gain.
Id.
27. Easterbrook and Jarrell, Do Targets Gain From Defeating Tender Offers? 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 277,
277-78 (1984).
28. Id. at 278. ("[Jludges ask whether a decision of this type could have been reached by people acting
at arms' length, with no self-interest. Judges are better at policing managers' loyalty than at policing their
astuteness.")
29. Gimbel v. Signal Cos., Inc., 316 A.2d 599, 608-09 (Del. Ch. 1974), affd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1974) (key aspect of business judgment rules provides directors are clothed with a rebuttable presumption
that they have acted in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation). "Application of the rule...
depends upon a showing that informed directors did, in fact, make a business judgment authorizing the transac-
tion under review." Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 23, 187 A.2d 405, 410 (1962) (court noted directors'
duty to explore alternatives to repurchase of corporate stock excused due to emergency situation. "They may
not have made the best decision; we cannot say.").
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conflicts of interest are often clearly identified in financial
newspapers, business periodicals, and textbooks, it seems that
courts deliberately ignore them.""
The immediate reason so few managers are held liable is that although state statutory or common law
rules imposed a duty of care on corporate managers, courts have adopted the eviscerating 'business
judgment rule'.... [C]ourts do not define 'mere effort,' nor do they apply criteria for what acts,
other than self-dealing, constitute a breach of the duty of care."
Although courts have generally found the presence of managerial
liability only where the conduct was so blatant that a layman with
no specialized knowledge would have found negligence,"2 one
commentator has observed, "[i]t is difficult to contend that a test
that is passed by proof of 'any business purpose' is an appropriate
standard of scrutiny for whether the directors are loyal to share-
holders."3
As corporations are subject to state law, and fiduciary standards
for directors are traditionally governed by state statutes, that in-
terpretation of directors' fiduciary duties and the business judg-
ment rule as applied by Delaware courts has far ranging
implications, as that state is the corporate home for almost half
of the Fortune 500 companies," and of that number 40.4 percent
are listed on the New York Stock Exchange." One authority has
noted that Delaware law has been criticized as "tantamount
to a license to mismanage or to deal unfairly with stock-
holders. . . ."' In an early Delaware decision, 7 the court set forth
the following standard:
[W]e think the discretion of a board of directors in the sale of its no par value stock should not be
interfered with, except for fraud, actual or constructive, such as improper motive of personal gain
30. Christy, supra note 25, at 117-18.
31. Id. at 109. But cf Easterbrook and Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1196-97 (1981). "There is no reason to believe that judicial scruti-
ny is more effective in policing management than various market forces, which provide incentives to manage-
ment to operate efficiently and keep share prices high. One mechanism creating such an incentive is the market
for corporate control, particularly the tender offer market." But see Brudney, The Role of the Board of Direc-
tors: The ALI and Its Critics, 37 U. MIAMI L. REv. 223-35 (1983).
Indeed the proposition that the markets alone are enough to discipline management has rarely
been urged by formal agencies of the business establishment in the past. On the contrary, they
have sought to convince the public that the legitimacy of managerial power and necessary con-
straints on its discretion derive from management's responsibility or accountability to stock-
holders (and possibly the public), and that directors are the key instrument in enforcing or
overseeing such responsibility.
Id.
32. Christy, supra note 25, at 168.
33. Greene and Junewicz, supra note 1, at 717.
34. Fortune 500 Industrial Corporations, FORTUNE 266-84 (April 29, 1985) (approximately forty-four
percent of Fortune 500 industrial companies are incorporated in Delaware).
35. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1985 (verification of situs of state of incorporation and of the trading
market for securities of Fortune 500 companies).
36. Arsht, Fiduciary Responsibilities of Directors, Officers and Key Employees, 4 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 652
(1979).
37. Bodell v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 420, 140 A. 264 (1927).
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or arbitrary action or conscious disregard of the interest of the corporation and the rights of its stock-
holders."
Thus, in Delaware, the limitations to the business judgment rule
are that it is not available to a director with a personal interest
in the transaction39 nor one who has not paid "informed attention
to his duties.""0 The business judgment rule, as applied by Dela-
ware courts, is a rebuttable presumption that "the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company. "41
The exercise of an informed business judgment implicates the
directors' duty of care, and the standard applied in determining
whether an informed decision was made is one of gross negli-
gence. "2 The court set forth the proper standard both as a matter
of law and fact in evaluating a director's duty in the context of
a proposed merger in Smith v. Van Gorkom," where it is indicat-
ed directors have a duty "to act in an informed and deliberate man-
ner in determining whether to approve an agreement of merger
before submitting the proposal to the stockholders.""
More recently, the Delaware court has begun to offer "enhanced
scrutiny" of decisions and actions in contemplation of an immi-
nent or threatened change of control by directors of target corpo-
rations,'" by more carefully delineating the scope and proper
application of the rebuttable presumption accorded to directors
by the business judgment rule."' In Unocal Corporation v. Mesa
Petroleum Co. ,' the target responded to the tender offer with an
issuer exchange offer predicated on exclusion of the bidder, 8
38. Id. at 420, 140 A. at 267.
39. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971) (in parent-subsidiary transac-
tions, business judgment rule applicable only where no self-dealing present); Chasin v. Gluck, 282 A.2d 188,
192 (Del. Ch. 1971) (presence of interlocking directors in challenged transaction does not shift the burden
of proof to the directors; "self-dealing" by a "dominant fiduciary must first be established" to invoke the "intrin-
sic fairness rule").
40. Gimbel, 316 A.2d at 608-09.
41. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (requiring the challenger to rebut the presumption
that the business judgment was the product of an informed decision); Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119,
124 (Del. Ch. 1971) (business judgment rule also encompasses decisions by executive officers, "in the absence
of any divided loyalty and in the light of subsequent ratification by the board of directors"); Warshaw v. Cal-
houn, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 221 A.2d 487, 493 (Del. 1966) (plaintiff challenging action of directors has burden
of "showing the existence of bad faith or abuse of discretion").
42. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985).
43. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
44. Id. at 873.
45. Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Company, 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (when the board
is confronted with a takeover bid, the court requires "enhance[d] ...judicial examination at the threshold
before the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred").
46. Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984) (business judgment rule is applicable in the context
of a takeover).
47. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
48. Id. at 951.
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which the bidder challenged as a violation of fiduciary duties owed
by target management to Mesa. 9 In matters of "fundamental cor-
porate change," the directors of Delaware corporations are not
"passive instrumentalit[ies]." " When confronted with a takeover
bid, "directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests
of the corporations's [sic] stockholders,""1 but they do not have
"unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived threat by any Draco-
nian means available."52
Thus, directors are required to "show that they had reasonable
grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and ef-
fectiveness existed because of another person's stock ownership,"
which burden is satisfied on a "showing [of] good faith and
reasonable investigation.""4 Furthermore, defensive measures
adopted by the corporation must be "reasonable in relation to the
threat posed" to be accorded the protection of the business judg-
ment rule.
With its decision in Santa Fe Indus., Inc., v. Green," the
Supreme Court indicated its unwillingness to create a federal cause
of action for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate direc-
tors. "Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are
reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corpo-
rations that deals with transactions in securities, particularly where
established state policies of corporation regulation would be over-
ridden." 7 Noting there may be a need for uniform federal fiduciary
standard to be applied in the case of mergers, the Court declined
to extend § 10(b) 8 and Rule lOb-5 9 to "regulated transactions which
constitute no more than internal corporate mismanagement." 0
Observing that prior to the decision in Santa Fe federal courts
49. Id. at 953.
50. Id. at 954.
51. Id. at 955 ("duty of care extends to protecting the corporation and its owners from perceived harm




55. Id. Although the court upheld the discriminatory exchange offer, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission subsequently promulgated rules prohibiting tender offers not extended to "all holders" of the class of
affected equity securities pursuant to 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f)(8)(i) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(1) (1986).
56. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
57. 430 U.S. at 479. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (state law governs power of"disinterest-
ed" directors to dismiss derivative suits).
58. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
59. SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
60. 430 U.S. at 479. In Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 597-98 (1973), the
Court also rejected the use of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S. C. § 78p(b) (1982), to deter
the evils attendant in a tender offer. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). "Corporations are creatures
of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where
federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will
govern the internal affairs of the corporation." Id.
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"actively sought to vindicate shareholder rights, while the state
courts were engaged [in] a 'race for the bottom,' "one commen-
tator notes it is now state courts, especially the Delaware courts,
that are protecting shareholder interests.61 "A theme underlying
the Delaware cases... is that of corporate accountability. Both
the federal and state courts are becoming less tolerant of director
self-dealing and conflicts of interest that inflict hardship on the
investing public."62
II. FIDUCIARY DUTIES VIS-A-VIS INHERENT CONFLICTS OF IN-
TEREST OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS IN THE CONTEXT OF TENDER
OFFERS: IMPLICATIONS OF DEFENSIVE TACTICS, GOLDEN
PARACHUTES, SHARK REPELLENT, AND GREENMAIL
In general, the judiciary had not perceived the response of tar-
get management to thwart tender offers through various devices
(e.g., shark repellent, golden parachutes, defensive tactics and
greenmail) as a category of conflict of interest that warranted ju-
dicial scrutiny, even when the action was one calculated to per-
petuate control of current management and/or offer substantial
premiums to executives that may be fired if the tender offer were
successful.63 However, with decisions in Unocal Corporation v.
Mesa Petroleum Co. ,64 Moran v. Household Int7. 6 and Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. " the Delaware court
has begun to take judicial cognizance of divergent and compet-
ing interest in takeover contests between shareholders and the
management of their corporations. As a result, once directors satis-
fy their burden under the Unocal test,67 the burden shifts to the
challenger to "[show] by a preponderance of the evidence that the
directors' decisions were primarily based on perpetuating them-
selves in office, or some other breach of fiduciary duty such as
fraud, overreaching, lack of good faith, or being uninformed."68
Although "tender offer"69 is not defined in the Williams Act,
61. Steinberg, Fiduciary Duties & Disclosure Obligations in Proxy and Tender Contests for Corporate
Control, 30 EMORY L. J. 169, 260-61 (Winter 1981). "It is only by showing that a potential state court action
would have existed for breach of fiduciary duty that a federal cause of action for disclosure violations will
arise." Id.
62. Id. at 261-62 n.306.
63. But see Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271,299 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981) (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "I emphatically disagree that the business
judgment rule should clothe directors, battling blindly to fend off a threat to their control, with an almost ir-
rebuttable presumption of sound business judgment, prevailing over everything but the elusive hobgoblins of
fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion."
64. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985).
65. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985).
66. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986).
67. See supra notes 53 - 55 and accompanying text.
68. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958.
69. See supra note 1.
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the response by target management with various approaches to
defeat the offer poses questions of liability under both federal and
state law. ' The defensive approaches utilized have been varied,
but all are implemented for the purpose of dissuading a tender
offer, either by making the acquisition so costly (in terms of cash
outlays, legal challenges of various types and degree of legitima-
cy, negative public opinion, etc.)" the target is no longer the "bar-
gain" it may have seemed to be, or by repurchase of corporate
stock and paying a premium to the tender offeror (otherwise known
as "greenmail").
In the lexicon of the business media, the responses by target
management to a tender offer may be categorized as follows:
defensive tactics" (e.g., creation of anti-trust problems,' acqui-
sition of a foreign subsidiary,' " acquisition of a heavily regulated
entity,' "cyanide capsule" agreements with lenders, suppliers, and
labor unions,' defensive mergers,"" lock-up arrangements with
a "friendly" bidder, 8 PAC-Man defense, 9 disposition of the cor-
70. Prentice, Target Board Abuse of Defensive Tactics: Can Federal Law Be Mobilized to Overcome the
Business Judgment Rule? 8 J. Cornu. LAW 337, 377 (Winter 1983).
71. See generally Prentice, supra note 70, at 340-43. See Cohn, Tender Offers and the Sale of Control:
An Analogue to Determine the Validity of Target Management Defensive Measures, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 475, 489
(Mar. 1981). "[A] hard hitting publicity campaign seizes upon every actual or contrived weakness of the ac-
quiror, occasionally causing even the most determined acquiror to consider whether the allegations and costs
of rebutting such campaigns are worth enduring."
72. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 555 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (noted target
board "fail[ed] to provide information" and instituted litigation to "inhibit the tender offer"). "[It is clear that
Roberts' group was prepared to employ a full panoply of defensive techniques in an attempt to abuse the ex-
change offer." However, it was not the presence of defensive tactics that seemed to have no purpose other
than discouraging the tender offer, upon which the plaintiff was granted relief, but the presence of a clear
violation of the federal securities laws. The court found the "misleading" information in the registration state-
ment to be "material." Cf Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Intl., Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 715 (5th Cit. 1984) (apply-
ing Texas law where the court found the Williams Act would not support an injunction premised upon any
"disadvantage" to target management in resisting a takeover). "The sole purpose of the Williams Act is full
and fair disclosure to investors, and in crafting that Act Congress was at extreme pains to avoid 'tipping the
scales either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bids.' " Id.
73. Prentice, supra note 70, at 340 (acquire bidder's competitors). "The allegation . . . is used by the
target management to thwart the offer in court." Id.
74. Id. at 341. For example, "[alcquisition of a Canadian subsidiary ...[requires] a potential tender
offeror ... to obtain the consent of the Canadian government under the Foreign Investment Review Act of
Canada, which will delay completion of the tender offer." Id.
75. Id. Acquire "a 'safe harbor'... [which is] a heavily regulated company such as a radio station or
a trucking line. [As such the target] not only makes itself less attractive to a tender offeror, it also slows down
the tender offer process by requiring government agency approval."
76. Id. "[l]nclude[s] a provision in a loan agreement to accelerate the target's debt repayment should a
change of control occur, or provisions in material or labor contracts that would subject them to cancellation
or renegotiation should control change hands." Id.
77. Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624, FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) § 98,728, 93,653 at 93,658 n. 13 (1982)
(in its brief as amicus curiae, the Securities and Exchange Commission indicated delay affords a target compa-
ny the opportunity to "arrange a defensive merger" in response to the tender offer).
78. Hanson Trust PLC v. MLSCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 267 (2d Cit. 1986) (applying New
York law) (purchase agreement designed to discourage hostile bidder from seeking control by providing to
a friendly bidder an option to acquire the target's most profitable businesses and/or assets). See infra notes
128-130 and accompanying text.
79. Martin Marietta Corp., 549 F. Supp. at 625 ("I'll eat you before you eat me" defense whereby the
target corporation counters with a hostile tender offer for the bidder).
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poration's crown jewels,80 and corporate suicide81); golden
parachutes; 2 shark repellent; "3 poison pill; " and greenmail. 5
Defensive Tactics
Even though congressional intent in enacting the Williams Act86
was not to favor the tender offeror or management in a bid for
control, but to protect the investor by requiring disclosure of in-
formation necessary for his decision, "' management has utilized
alleged Williams Act " disclosure violations by tender offerors as
another defensive tactic to defeat the potential offer. 9 Although
directors of target corporations have been allowed to bring these
80. Hanson Trust PLC, 781 F.2d at 270 (refers to a target's most profitable businesses and/or assets,
which make the target a desirable acquisition). See Steyer, supra note 2, at 48. Divestitures are rising through-
out industry and for a variety of reasons: debt reduction, changes in corporate strategy, and defense against
takeovers. "Divestitures are no longer just kicking out turkeys," says Stephen Friedman, a partner in Goldman
Sachs. "There is no stigma to selling an attractive division if you have a better use for the funds." Id.
81. Prentice, supra note 70 at 343. "[T]he most drastic defensive measure of all, corporate suicide, is
the liquidation of the corporation in the face of a hostile tender offer." Id.; cf Cohn, supra note 71, at 486.
Corporations may be attractive takeover candidates because of substantial liquid assets that may be used by
acquirers to fund the acquisitions or expansion of their own operations. It is not uncommon for such candidates
to deliberately reduce their charm through the payment of cash dividends, cash acquisitions of companies or
major assets, and the premature retirement or redemption of debt and preferred securities.
82. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178 n.5 ('termination agreements providing substantial bonuses and other benefits
for managers and certain directors upon a change in control of a company").
83. Texas Partners v. Conrock Co., 685 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1982) (anti-takeover amendments to the
Certificate of Incorporation and by-laws included supermajority voting provision for mergers or other business
combinations with related parties, and required that the majority of the board consist of outside directors).
84. Dynamics Corporation of America v. CTS Corporation, 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986). prob. juris.
noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986) (applying Indiana law) ("family of shareholder rights agreements which, upon
some triggering event such as the acquisition by a tender offeror of a certain percentage of the target corpora-
tion's common stock, entitle the remaining shareholders to receive additional shares of common stock (or other
securities) at bargain prices"). See Moran, 500 A.2d 1346 (shareholder rights plan ("poison pill") is legitimate
exercise of business judgment by directors); Gearhart, 741 F.2d at 723 (board made sufficient showing of
fairness of warrants/debentures; no breach of duty of loyalty); Gulf v. Mesa Petroleum, 582 F. Supp. 1110,
1115 (D. Del. 1984) (court denied Mesa's application for preliminary injunction in response to adoption of
poison pill by Gulf). See also SEC Office of the Chief Economist, "The Effects of Poison Pills on the Wealth
of Target Shareholders" 43 (Oct. 23, 1986) ("find[ing] no statistical evidence that pills have systematically
benefited target shareholders").
85. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
86. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781-83 (1982).
87. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1977). See supra note 72.
88. See supra note 86.
89. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975). By requiring disclosure of information
to the target corporation as well as the Securities and Exchange Commission, Congress intended to do no more
than give incumbent management an opportunity to express and explain its position. The Congress expressly
disclaimed an intention to provide a weapon for management to discourage takeover bids or prevent large ac-
cumulations of stock which would create the potential for such attempts. See Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone &
Sons, Inc., 488 F.2d 207, 215 (2d Cir. 1973) (in appeal by target corporation, circuit court held district court
acted within its discretion in permitting offeror to amend its Schedule 13D statement [SEC Rule 13d-l(a), 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(a) (1982)] to include required financial data, thus permitting the tender offer to proceed).
But see Berman v. Gerber Products Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1323 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (quoting Northwest
Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. i1. 1969) (injunction sought by Gerber, based
on alleged violations of federal securities and antitrust laws, was proper exercise of management's fiduciary
duty to "oppose offers which, in its best judgment, are detrimental to the company or its stockholders").
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actions, commentators have suggested the interests of target
management and shareholders may conflict in this situation, and
"there is too great a risk that a management-initiated suit will be
a dilatory tactic intended to defeat a tender offer beneficial to share-
holders."9 ° In Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp. ,"' the Court up-
held the lower court's refusal to grant an injunction against the
offeror absent a showing of "irreparable harm."92 The Court ob-
served respondent's shareholders were unlikely to be "disadvan-
taged should petitioner make a tender offer, . . . [nor would]
respondent be unable to adequately place its case before them
should a contest for control develop."93
The Court in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus. ," also refused to grant
relief under federal securities laws to tender offerors who allege
violations of disclosure provisions of the Williams Act by target
management,9" and under the Cort v. Ash96 analysis determined
it "appropriate... in this instance to relegate [the offeror-bidder]
and others in [that] situation to whatever remedy is 'created by
state law,' at least to the extent that the offeror seeks damages
for having been wrongfully denied a 'fair opportunity' to com-
pete for control of another corporation. " "' Justice Stevens in his
dissent argued that tender offerors are also a member of the share-
holder class sought to be protected 8 under § 14(e)," ' and that the
new "remedy which will most effectively deter violations of the
statute is unquestionably the private damages action. " "
90. Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 31, at 1194; cf Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) § 96,286, at 92,833 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1978) (injunction justified
where target management "disseninate[d] materially false and misleading statements" regarding the bidder's
offer to its hareholders).
91. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
92. Id. at 61.
93. Id. at 59.
94. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
95. Id. at 42 (Chris-Craft, as a defeated tender offeror, has no implied cause of action for damages under
§ 14(e). Cf Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Aztec Oil & Gas Co., 406 F. Supp. 910, 915 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (injunction
granted to compel target management to furnish list of its shareholders, so that bidder could disseminate infor-
mation about its tender offer). But see Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 372 (6th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). In what is a minority view, the Sixth Circuit held Mobil, as tender offeror,
had an implied cause of action under the Williams Act to enjoin both the target and the "white knight" from
making improper disclosure and utilizing "manipulative" practices (i.e., "poison pill" and "crown jewel") as
defenses to the tender offer. Id. at 367, 369.
96. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
97. 430 U.S. at 41.
98. Id. at 59 (Stephens, J., dissenting). ("Once one recognizes that Congress intended to rely heavily
on private litigation as a method of implementing the statute, it seems equally clear that Congress would not
exclude the persons most interested in effective enforcement from the class authorized to enforce the new law.").
Id. at 62. (Stephens, J., dissenting).
99. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
100. 430 U.S. at 61 (Stephens, J., dissenting). "Just as management will most effectively challenge viola-
tions by the invader, so it is equally clear that a company committed to an attempt to acquire control of a target
company will be the most zealous guardian of the shareholders' interest in having management comply with
the law." Id. at 63. (Stephens, J., dissenting).
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A lower court decision which probably signals the extreme to
which federal courts will go in applying the business judgment
rule to avoid creating a federal cause of action for a breach of
director's fiduciary duty in the context of a hostile tender offer
is Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.' In ignoring the other than
obvious self-dealing in the extensive tactics employed by manage-
ment, the court cited Santa Fe... in relegating the alleged breach
of fiduciary duty to any remedy available under state law." 3
The claim that the defendants are allowed to profit by their own wrong is irrelevant to this case. Such
an argument would require proof of a causal link between the defendant's wrongful acts or omissions
and the withdrawal of the tender offer. Here there was uncontroverted evidence that it was Field's
recent acquisition [designed to create antitrust problems] and plans for expansion that caused the with-
drawal of the [Carter Hawley Hale] tender offer. The decision to make acquisitions is one governed
by the state law of directors' fiduciary duty."'
Even if the plaintiffs could establish that the actions taken to defeat
the tender offer were taken to perpetuate the control of the in-
cumbent board and management, the court observed, "neither the
policy nor a failure to disclose its existence can give rise to a fed-
eral securities law cause of action absent the element of manipu-
lation or deception required by Rule lOb-5." ' In response to
plaintiffs' further contentions that the defensive acquisitions "were
imprudent, and designed to make Field's less attractive as an ac-
quisition, as well as to exacerbate any antitrust problems created
by the CHH merger, " " the court invoked the business judgment
rule, and reiterated as the rule's rationale that it was intended to
101. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981).
102. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
103. 646 F.2d at 282.
104. Id. at 285. See Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378, 382 (minority view) (affirming
Marathon's preliminary injunction on antitrust claims, in the absence of convincing evidence "that the merger
[of two oil companies] would benefit the economy, increase operating efficiency, bring advantages of scale,
or substitute better management"); Christy, supra note 25, at 161 ("The laws of most states require directors,
and presumably officers, to exercise the degree of care, skill, prudence, and diligence that reasonable men
in a like position would exercise in similar circumstances."). But see Royal Indus. v. Monogram Indus.
(1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) § 95,863, at 91,136 (CD Cal. Nov. 29, 1976) (a pre-
Piper decision where the court enjoined a defensive acquisition attempted for the "sole, primary, compeling
and controlling purpose ... to thwart the monogram tender offer").
105. 646 F.2d at 288.
The critical issue in determining whether conduct meets the requirement of deception, the Court
announced in Santa Fe Industries, is whether the conduct complained of includes the omission
or misrepresentation of a material fact, or whether it merely states a claim for a breach of
a state law duty. A board of directors' decision to oppose or welcome a takeover attempt in-
volves the exercise of directorial judgment inherent in their role in corporate governance.
Id.
106. Id. at 297.
[Vol. 7:117
FIDUCIARY DUTY IN TENDER OFFER DEFENSES
prevent "Monday-morning quarterbacking."" °7 By invoking the
"rule," the court effectively insulated the board from judicial scru-
tiny as well as liability to shareholders for their actions.
Judge Cudahy (concurring in part and dissenting in part) makes.
a distinction between management of the corporation as a busi-
ness enterprise (for which the business judgment rule is applica-
ble) and the corporation's
[flunction as a vehicle for collecting and using capital and distributing profits and losses. The former
involves corporate functioning in competitive business affairs in which judicial interference may be
undesirable. The latter involves only the corporation-shareholder relationship, in which the courts may
more justifiably intervene to insist on equitable behavior.",
He also observed that conflict of interest for corporate direc-
tors is inherent in a hostile tender offer, which makes judicial ap-
plication of the business judgment rule inappropriate." All
directors are "interested" to one degree or another," 0 and suffi-
cient evidence was presented by plaintiffs to shift the burden of
proof to the directors to "prove that the transaction was fair and
107. Id. at 297. ("Again, the plaintiffs have brought forth no evidence of bad faith, overreaching, or self-
dealing or any other fraud necessary to shift the burden of justifying the transactions to the defendants.").
But see 646 F.2d 271, 302 (7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[T]he challenged board activity occurred after CHH made known its acquisitive intentions
.... When reviewed against a background of cast-in-concrete hostility to merger offers, the
hasty acquisition of five Liberty House Stores in the Pacific Northwest (two of which were
acknowledged "dogs"), the $17 million commitment for a Field's store in the Galleria Com-
plex in Houston, Texas (the site of a CHH Neiman-Marcus store) and the institution of a major
antitrust action within hours of a merger proposal (ostensibly on the mere oral opinion of com-
pany counsel) represent some of the facts from which a jury might reasonably conclude that
the directors improperly sought to perpetuate their control of the corporation.
Id.
Cf. Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 31, at 1198 ("[U]nlike transactions involving a conflict of managerial
interest outside the realm of tender offers, efforts undertaken by target management primarily to resist a takeover
bid should not even be susceptible to the justification that they happen to benefit the target.").
108. 646 F.2d 271, 299-300 (7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Note, Protection for Shareholder Interests in Recapitalizations of Publicly Held Companies, 58 COLUM. L.
REv. 1030, 1066 (1958) (emphasis supplied)).
109. Id. at 300, n.l. (citing Gelfond and Sebastina, Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management in the
Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U.L. REv. 403, 435-37 (1980)); see id. at 300. ("Despite this potential for abuse,
the majority relies heavily on the business judgment rule's presumption of good faith in the exercise of cor-
porate decision-making power and attaches special significance to the 'independence' of Field's Board."); Pren-
tice, supra note 70, at 345. "[There is ever increasing evidence that a 'business purpose' to support management's
actions is easily fabricated as almost any contest ostensibly involves issues of policy."
110. 646 F.2d 271, 300-301.
Directors of a New York Stock Exchange-listed company are. .. "interested" in their own
positions of power, prestige and prominence . . . . They are "interested" in defending against
outside attack the management which they have, in fact, installed or maintained in power -
"their" management (to which in many cases, they owed their directorships). And they are
"interested" in maintaining the public reputation of their own leadership and stewardship against
the claims of "raiders" who say that they can do better.
Id.
Cf., Prentice, supra note 70, at 343-44.
Target management is called upon to exercise its fiduciary duties to the shareholders, even
though that might jeopardize its own future financial interests .... The shareholders' position
is clear; the high success rate of tender offers indicates that shareholders are quite pleased
to tender their shares for a premium, if given the opportunity.
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reasonable to the corporation."111 "The majority here, however,
affirm[ed] a directed verdict which determin[ed] that the evidence
was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that Field's direc-
tors were interested in this transaction."1 2
In Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp. ," a Maryland fed-
eral district court refused to enjoin the deployment of the "Pac-
man" defense by Martin Marietta in response to the Bendix tender
offer, absent "credible evidence" that target management acted
in bad faith and not in the best interests of the corporation.1 ' The
court indicated that the Martin Marietta Board owed a fiduciary
duty not to the management of Bendix, but to the shareholders
of Bendix; thus, in refusing to halt its tender offer for Bendix,
Marietta's Board "acted in a manner reasonably believed to be
in the best interests of Bendix's shareholders," ''  as required by
the business judgment rule as applied in Maryland.
Further, the court found it significant that the Marietta Board
was composed principally of disinterested (non-management)
directors."6 In making its decision that the "combination of the
two corporations would be best achieved pursuant to the terms
of Marietta's offer," 1 the court found substantial evidence sup-
ported the Marietta Board's assessment that the current Bendix
management had "little managerial competence or experience in
Marietta's businesses." ''" Although Marietta's management was
inexperienced in the non-aerospace businesses of Bendix, under
the Maryland business judgment rule the court could not find the
Marietta Board's belief that it was more competent to manage a
combined Marietta-Bendix entity unreasonable. 9 Nor may Ben-
Such conflict of interest is a matter of serious concern when it leads target management to
unfairly persuade shareholders to refrain from tendering their shares. Worse still, the share-
holders frequently do not even get an opportunity to make the choice of whether or not to
tender because many defensive tactics 'prevent the offer from being made, or if made, con-
summated, and thereby ensure that shareholders cannot make, from management's perspec-
tive, the 'wrong' decision .... These [Williams Act] disclosure provisions are of little use
to shareholders who are prevented from ever exercising [the choice of whether or not to tender
their shares].'
Id.
111. 646 F.2d 271.
112. 646 F.2d at 301; cf Loewenstein, Tender Offer Litigation And State Law, 63 N.C.L. REv. 493 (1985)
suggesting the use of the "tort of interference with prospective economic advantage" in tender offer litigation.
Id. at 499. "Two fundamental requirements, however, are that he plaintiff have a reasonable expectancy of
achieving an economic advantage and that the defendant harm the plaintiff by interfering w th this expectancy." Id.
113. 549 F. Supp. 623 (Md. 1982).
114. Id. at 634.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 633.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 633-34.
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dix, consistent with its fiduciary duty under Maryland law, as a
majority shareholder of Marietta, exercise its majority position
to require the corporation to "abandon a desirable business op-
portunity."120
In Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp. ,2' Hi-Shear management engaged
in a series of maneuvers to counter the effect of a hostile tender
offer. In addressing the plaintiff-tender offeror's state law claims
for "breach of trust," the Ninth Circuit indicated that California
fiduciary standards "protect the substantive rights of minority
shareholders such as Klaus," unlike federal securities laws which
focus on protecting the "corporation's right to informed proxy vot-
ing by its stockholders, or the shareholder's right to accept or re-
ject tender offers intelligently." ' Since the rule in California is
that "majority stockholders have a fiduciary responsibility to the
interests of both the corporation and the minority stockholders,"
the burden is on management to show "a compelling business pur-
pose," for a transaction challenged on the basis that the action
was one taken to promote an advantage in favor of management,
to the detriment of the corporation or a minority shareholder.'
Adoption of a Preferred Share Purchase Rights Plan in Moran
v. Household International, Inc.2 ' (commonly referred to as a
"poison pill,") as a pre-planned defensive tactic is also a "legiti-
mate exercise of business judgment"" 5 for directors of Delaware
corporations. Under the "Household Plan," holders of the Com-
pany's common stock are issued Rights equal to the number of
shares of common stock held upon the occurrence of either an
"announcement of a tender offer for 30 percent of Household's
shares ("30% trigger")" or "acquisition of 20 percent of House-
hold's shares by any single entity or group ("20% trigger")."126
Upon occurrence of a 30% trigger, the Rights issued are "exer-
cisable to purchase 1/100 share of new preferred stock for $100
and are redeemable by the Board for $.50 per Right." 27 Rights
issued upon a 20 % trigger are also exercisable to purchase 1/100
share of preferred stock, but are not redeemable. However, rights-
holders who do not exercise the Rights to purchase preferred stock
120. Id. at 634.
121. Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975) (applying California law) (quoted Jones v.
H. F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, (1969) for the proposition that [majority
shareholders may not use their power to control corporate activities to benefit themselves alone or in a manner
detrimental to the minority."). Id. at 233.
122. fd. at 234.
123. Id. at 233.
124. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
125. Id. at 1348.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1349.
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can exercise the Rights to purchase $200 of the common stock
of the tender offeror for $100 in the event of a subsequent merg-
er or consolidation. "8 In applying the Unocal test, 129 the court in-
dicated
[d]irectors . . . faced with a tender offer and a request to redeem the Rights . . . will not be able to
arbitrarily reject the offer. They will be held to the same fiduciary standards any other board of direc-
tors would be held to in deciding to adopt a defensive mechanism, the same standard as they were
held to in originally approving the Rights Plan.'"
Although use of a lock-up as a defensive measure is not per
se illegal in Delaware,"' when it is used to "end an active auction
and foreclose further bidding," rather than to induce a "white
knight" to enter the bidding process, the lock-up is detrimental
to shareholder interest.'32 In Revlon, the court found the actions
of the board did not satisfy the "enhanced scrutiny" of the Unocal
standard, because the bidding contest was ended on an "insub-
stantial basis" and a "significant by-product of that action [was]
to protect the directors against a perceived threat of personal lia-
bility for consequences stemming from the adoption of previous
"1133defensive measures.
Generally, directors breach their fiduciary duties to the corpo-
ration and its shareholders, when they use corporate resources 14
for the "sole or primary purpose"' of obtaining or retaining con-
trol of the corporation in themselves. However, allegations of "a"
motive for retaining control are insufficient as a basis for finding
a breach of fiduciary duties by the directors,136 unless they are
accompanied by a showing that the "directors acted in bad faith,
or in furtherance of their own interest, or for some other improper
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1350; see also supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
130. Id. at 1354.
131. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 183 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986).
132. Id. at 183.
133. Id. at 184 ("Market forces must be allowed to operate freely to bring the target's shareholders the
best price available for their equity.").
134. Campbell v. Loews, 134 A.2d 852, 864 (Del. Ch. 1957) (the Vogel group was entitled to "reasonable
use of corporate funds to present its position to stockholders," since it symbolized existing corporate policy;
however, it was not entitled to use "corporate facilities and employees in connection with its solicitation").
135. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (1977), overruled, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701 (Del. 1983) (overruled Singer requirement of a business purpose for parent- subsidiary mergers) ("those
who control the corporate machinery owe a fiduciary duty to the minority in the exercise thereof over cor-
porate powers and property, and the use of such power to perpetuate control is a violation of that duty"); Chica-
go Stadium Corp. v. Scallen, 530 F.2d 204, 207 (8th Cir. 1976) (quoting 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 795 (1940)
for the proposition that "directors or officers who cause unissued or treasury shares to be issued to themselves
or others solely for the purpose of obtaining or maintaining control of the corporation breach their fiduciary
duty to the shareholders").
136. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981) (apply-
ing Delaware law) ("We do not think that a showing of 'a' motive to retain control, without more, constitutes
bad faith in this context unless we are to ignore the realities of corporate life.").
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purpose."" 7 Thus, the business judgment rule..8 has been used in
the analysis of the challenged transaction, and unless the plaintiff
can rebut the presumption of good faith accorded to actions of
directors, the court will not interfere in that judgment.
In requiring management to "demonstrate more than that the
corporation derived some advantage for its actions,""' the "com-
pelling business purpose test" in Klaus... seems to be a higher stan-
dard of proof than that applied in Johnson,"' which used the "sole
or primary motive" test.. of Cheff v. Mathes. "3 "The sole ques-
tion is management's state of mind at the time of the transaction,"
and under Delaware law, subsequent events are not considered
in making this determination, unless "they shed light on motive
at the time of the transaction."'" To the extent the analysis in the
Delaware decisions in Unocal," ' Moran,"" and Revlon' 7 are fol-
lowed in other jurisdictions, defensive tactics of directors that are
potentially detrimental to shareholders will be subject to "enhanced
scrutiny," when the board seeks to interpose the protections of
the business judgment rule during judicial review of the procedural
aspects of its decision-making.
Golden Parachutes
Golden parachute employment contracts for target corporation
management are another aspect of director-shareholder relations
that inherently pose conflicts of interest to the directors' fiduciary
137. Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New Jersey law).
138. Treadway, 638 F.2d at 382 ("these cases are best reconciled by reference to the analysis typically
employed under [the business judgment] rule"); Johnson, 629 F.2d at 293 (business judgment rule's presump-
tion of good faith and that a "business judgment was exercised" remains, "unless . . . plaintiff tender[s] evi-
dence from which... factfinder might conclude... defendant's sole or primary motive was to retain control');
Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Il. 1969) (applying New York
law) ("[M]anagement has the responsibility to oppose offers which, in its best judgment, are detrimental to
the company or its stockholders").
139. Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 233 (9th Cir. 1975).
140. 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975).
141. 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980).
142. Id. at 293.
143. 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
144. 629 F.2d at 294. But see Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 301 (3d Cir. 1980) (Rosenn, J., con-
curring and dissenting) (applying Delaware law):
Unlike the majority, I believe that under Delaware law, once plaintiff has shown that the desire
to retain control was a motive in the particular business decision under challenge, the burden
is then on the defendant to move forward with evidence justifying the transaction as primarily
in the corporation's best interest.
Id.
145. 493 A.2d 946.
146. 500 A.2d 1346.
147. 506 A.2d 173.
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duties owed to shareholders.' 8 "As a matter of common sense,
the potential for officer and director negligence and abuse of the
'undivided loyalty' owed the corporation and its shareholders is
greater when 'golden parachutes' are in place. " '
Unlike traditional employment contracts, the golden parachute
is inoperative until "triggered by a change of control in an execu-
tive's corporation."' With guaranteed salary and benefits for five
or more years after a change of control (or a lump sum payment),"'1
the golden parachute is expensive, and has been criticized as "waste
and . . . tantamount to common-law fraud or theft of corporate
assets."" 2 Although the Business Roundtable recognizes the poten-
tial for abuse that golden parachutes present in the corporate
takeover, they have not formulated a specific plan that could be
implemented by legislation, as "business leaders are opposed to
any plan that would have government officials setting executive
remuneration standards." ''
148. Easterbrook and Jarrell, supra note 27, at 278 ("Tender offers create conflicts of loyalty in almost
every case: to defend against the offer is to defend against a threat to one's job as well. Managers' promises
of fidelity to shareholders' interests are less likely to be honored when the stakes are so large for the managers
themselves."); see Comment, Tender Offer Defenses: The Need for National Guidelines in Light of Mobil, 21
SAN DIEGo L. Rv. 1151, 1152 (1984).
Section 14(e) does not effectively combat certain inherent problems in defenses to hostile tender
offers. For example, 14(e) does not address the inherent conflict of interest a target director
faces when confronted with a hostile tender offer. The conflict arises because the director
must decide whether to act in his own self interest and insure his job and power within the
corporation or to act in the shareholders' best interests and objectively evaluate the tender offer.
Id.
149. Johnson, Anti-takeover Actions and Defenses: Business Judgment or Breach of Duty?, 28 VILL. L.
REv. 51, 70-71 (1982) ("Clearly the 'golden parachute' agreement is prejudicial to corporate shareholders, in-
eludes self-dealing on the part of corporate directors and officers, and results in a 'raid' of the corporate treasu-
ry[,] . ..[which] should be prohibited as it constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty.").
150. Note, Golden Parachutes: Erecutive Employment Contracts, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1117, 1118-19
(Summer 1983). "[G]olden parachutes provide executives with lucrative severance packages, which can in-
clude cash settlements in excess of several times an executive's yearly income." Id. at 1119-20.
151. Id. at 1122. "The Ward Howell study revealed that the golden parachute agreement at the typical
corporation protects two to five executives for more than the 5 years following a change of control at a poten-
tial cost to the corporation of $1 to $5 million." Golden parachutes vary in terms of the "number of executives
covered, the number of years of coverage, the potential costs, the specific circumstances that constitute a change
of control, and the particular circumstances that entitle an executive to receive benefits under the agreement
after a change of control has occurred." Id. at 1120 n.9.
152. Id. at 1122-23. "Since golden parachute agreements often dictate the payment of extravagant cash
settlements to executives dismissed following a change of control in the executives' corporation, critics main-
tain that corporations do not receive adequate consideration in return for the payments extended to executives
under the agreements." Id. See also Minstar Acquiring Corporation v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (applying New Jersey law) ("scorched earth" tactics, including creation of a Severance Allowance Plan
for certain salaried employees, triggered by a change of control support inference board was acting only to
entrench itself, thus shifting the burden to the board under the business judgment role).
153. Williams, Businessmen to Seek End to "Greenmail', "Golden Parachutes, Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 1985,
reprinted in, 131 CoNG. REc. S675 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985) (statement of Mr. Riegel) ("But Mr. Siegler [chair-
man, special industry task force reviewing hostile-take-over problems] said he favored a measure that would
restrict special payments to executives removed by a takeover. He said executives should have to follow their
usual employment contract.").
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Although proponents of golden parachutes assert they are benefi-
cial to the corporation because they permit target corporation ex-
ecutives to objectively evaluate tender offers,"' they overlook that
the fiduciary duty owed to the corporation and its shareholders
"already necessitates management's objectivity during corporate
takeovers;" therefore, the golden parachute does not serve a legiti-
mate corporate objective.'
The conflict of interest between the shareholder and corporate
management is even more obvious where directors and officers
have a dual role as members of the board of directors, and are
thus in a position to approve golden parachute contracts to pro-
tect their pecuniary interest, which is manifestly the height of self-
dealing.5 6 There is a requirement that golden parachute contracts
with certain executive level management must be reported to the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The disclosure provisions
of federal securities laws for registrants and companies in the
reporting system require a description of any plan or arrangement
for the five most highly compensated executive officers triggered
by termination of employment, change in control, or change in
job responsibilities following a change in control where the amount
involved exceeds $60,000.l' Although this requirement would
not include other management personnel that have received golden
parachute contracts, one commentator suggests these would also
have to be disclosed under federal securities law which requires
"disclosure of material information to security market par-
ticipants."158
The commentator observed that given the prevalence of gold-
en parachutes in industry,' and the need to provide managerial
stability during an impending takeover, 60 "golden parachute con-
tracts carefully drafted to advance the corporate objective of main-
taining a senior management team represent the most efficient
means of compensating senior executives for the increased risks
attendant to corporate takeovers. " "
154. Note, supra note 150, at 1133. But see McLaughlin, The Myth of the Golden Parachute, 8 MERGERS
& AcQulsrrIoNs 47, 48 (Summer 1982); ("This argument ignores what may be one of the most powerful areas
of self-interest on the part of anybody fighting against a takeover: They want to have their own company;
they don't want to be a part of DuPont, or General Electric, or United Technologies.").
155. Note, supra note 150, at 1139 n.108.
156. Id. at 1129 n.47.
157. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(e) (1986).
158. Note, supra note 150 at 1146. See generally Le Beau, The New 'Golden Parachute" Rules, 3 Journal
of Buyouts & Acquisitions 3 (Feb./Mar. 1985).
159. Note, supra note 150, at 1131.
160. Id. at 1132-33.
161. Id. at 1144.
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Although there may be legitimate corporate objectives to be at-
tained through the use of golden parachutes, the compensation
should be comparable to the benefit received by the corporation
from the executive's services to be covered,"" should be recom-
mended by an executive compensation committee composed of
outside directors, and should be approved by the full board, with
those members who are to benefit from the golden parachute ab-
staining.1" It is when these procedures are utilized that the direc-
tors minimize the risk of breach of fiduciary duty attendant with
lucrative executive and management severance contracts. 64
Shark Repellent
In an effort to make a sudden shift in control of the corporation
all but impossible to achieve as a result of a tender offer, manage-
ment has sought amendments to the articles of incorporation and/or
by-laws ("shark repellent") that "specify broad areas for board of
directors' concerns, increase the minimum vote required for merg-
ers, and protect against wholesale changes in board composi-
tion. " "" Although it is urged that any appropriate regulation of
shark repellent should be subject only to state, rather than feder-
al regulation,'" other commentators suggest shark repellent "should
162. [Glolden parachute agreement should cover only the senior executives who, in the sound
business judgment of a corporation's board of directors, represent the corporation's most
valued executives [As] [clorporate expenditures made pursuant to golden parachute agree-
ments that cover more than the corporation's most valued executives may facilitate corporate
waste[,] since the agreements may benefit only the less competent target corporation execu-
tives whom an acquiring corporation fires following a change of control.
Id. at 1142.
163. Id. at 1145.
164. See Steinberg, supra note 61, at 242-43, n.224.
If the target corporation's actions are made pursuant to the recommendations of a truly independent
committee of the board of directors, courts should apply the traditional business judgment rule. However,
if the decisions are made by interested management, courts should not defer to management but should
scrutinize the decision under a stringent liability, or fairness, standard of review.
Id.
See generally McLaughlin, supra note 154, at 47 (characterizing the golden parachute as a "risky and ques-
tionable response to complex post-merger policy issues").
165. Cohn, supra note 71, at 481. Other amendments include supermajority shareholder vote to approve
a merger 'with any party that has previously obtained a specified minimum percentage of shares", provide
for a "classified board of directors... delaying the ability of the acquiring company to obtain majority control
of the board and provide for removal of directors only upon a showing of cause." Id. at 481-82; see Johnson,
supra note 149, at 71-73.
Once such a [supermajority vote] provision is adopted, management can effectively grant itself a veto
power over all tender offers if it accumulates only five percent of the outstanding stock or places five
percent of the stock in 'friendly' hand. Such a concentration of power is alarming, especially in the
context of a publicly held corporation. Not only are supermajority voting provisions oppressive when
adopted in the context of a publicly held corporation, but these provisions also involve a degree of
self-dealing on the part of management .... Moreover, since tender offers are actually offers made
directly to shareholders, any attempt to enhance management's power to deny shareholders the ability
to accept such an offer should be struck down as a breach of management's fiduciary duty.
Id.
166. Lautzenhiser, State and Federal Regulation of Shark Repellent Provisions: How Much is Needed?,
11 No. KY. L. REv. 481, 503-04 (1984).
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be prohibited per se."167 Inasmuch as resistance to tender offers
is costly to the shareholder, one approach advocated is for share-
holders to adopt charter amendments that instruct "managers to
acquiesce in tender offers;""" however, the approach used and
favored by management is to adopt shark repellent to not only
make acquisition difficult but to also raise the effective price of
an acquisition and increase the offeror's risk. 6
Where unduly restrictive shark repellents are adopted, target firm shareholders will suffer an immedi-
ate loss of value. If target management is maximizing the present value of the firm through efficient
management, that loss will be swamped by expectations of continued efficient management and will
be of little concern to investors. But where management is not so maximizing and where some gains
were formerly possible from a takeover, share prices will fall to the extent of the additional costs im-
posed and the reduced probability of a takeover.-
0
Not all shark repellent provisions are designed solely to thwart
tender offers. Some amendments are designed to "assure that all
target company shareholders are treated fairly""1 during an im-
pending takeover. As such, any proposed state regulation should
protect the ability of the board to use charter amendments that
"clearly serve the best interest of the shareholders and the corpo-
rations."172
In the absence of competitive bidding for shares, target firm shareholders must concern themselves
with structuring methods by which they can either coordinate negotiations with hostile bidders or structure
their assent in a manner that assures the best price for their shares . . . To this extent, at least, the
interests of target management are aligned with those of its shareholders."'
The presence of shark repellent, as a strategy for defeating un-
welcome tender offers is another area where the interests of direc-
tors and officers and the corporation's shareholders conflict.
Questions of validity are most sharply raised with regard to aggressive antitakeover measures that at-
tempt to create a porcupine-type defense not dependent upon the hope that shareholders will reject
the tender offer either because of loyalty to, or the persuasive logic of, target management .... Ag-
167. Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 31, at 1203, n. 122. "The business judgment rule should not ap-
ply, however, to unambiguous preventive defensive tactics such as shark-repellent charter and bylaw amend-
ments." Id.
168. Id. at 1180.
169. Id. at 1180-81.
170. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against
Fiduciary Duties, 1983 Am. B. FOUND. Rs. J., 341, 390 (Spring).
171. Lautzenhiser, supra note 166, at 481. "[N]umerous companies have adopted fair price provisions
and other charter provisions designed to discourage two-tier, front-end loaded takeover bids."
172. Id. at 504.
173. Carney, supra note 170, at 373.
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gressive defensive measures are designed to impose substantial tactical and administrative barriers to
the pursuance of a hostile tender offer."'
A 1983 SEC advisory committee report on tender offers recom-
mended congressional or SEC prohibitions on shark repellent
"that . . erect high barriers to change of corporate control" be-
cause they "improperly interfere with the conduct of takeovers
in the national market place. """
[Als pre-tender charter amendments tend to perpetuate incumbent management and reduce shareholder
welfare, they . . . tend to circumvent normal market demand and act as a restraint on the normal
trading of securities. As such, those devices, at least where they are sufficiently connected with a tender
offer, should give rise to a federal cause of action for violation of the Williams Act in addition to
the state cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty . . . . The market place should dictate manage-
ment's future, not deliberately conceived plans to further management's economic and personal well-
being."'
Target management has also attempted to use state corporation
statutes which authorize by-law amendments " that directors can
adopt using the corporate proxy machinery, to make it more
difficult for a tender offeror or dissident shareholder to effectu-
ate a change of control. In Siebert v. Milton Bradley Co.,'" the
challenged by-law only provided a mechanism for "determining
what shareholder vote will suffice to approve a merger or con-
solidation proposal." " The court indicated there had been no at-
tempt to "delegate to the Milton Bradley directors the power to
'make, amend or repeal' a by-law concerning the shareholder vote
required for a merger or consolidation, in violation"" of applicable
state statutes; therefore, directors were "powerless to change the
voting scheme established by the shareholders." 8' The court ob-
174. Cohn, supra note 71, at 480; see Johnson, supra note 149, at 68.
The object of these maneuvers is to deny the successful tender offeror effective control of
the corporation, or to make the cost of the offer so prohibitive that any potential acquirer will
think twice about making a tender offer. Some of these 'pre-tender' actions, however, clearly
involve conflicts of interest, oppression of minority shareholders, or "non-business like" judg-
ments, and if not completely prohibited, they should at least be subject to judicial scrutiny
free of the business judgment rule.
Id.
175. Lautzenhiser, supra note 166, at 508.
176. Johnson, supra note 149, at 73.
177. Siebert v. Milton Bradley Co., 405 N.E.2d 131 (Mass. 1980) (supermajority voting provision valid);
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971) (attempted by-law change advancing the annual
shareholders' meeting held invalid); Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 421 A.2d 906, 914 (Del. Ch. 1980)
(those contesting control of incumbent corporate management in a proxy contest are not "required to be in
a state of 'shelf-readiness' in order to meet a sudden advancement of the [annual meeting] date"). But see FMC
Corp. v. R.P. Scherer Corp. [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) § 98,800, at 94,091 (D.Del.
August 5, 1982) (where the tender offer was made after the challenged by-law provisions were proposed, ab-
sent a showing of irreparable harm by target shareholders or the tender offeror, order to enjoin a "shareholder
vote on anti-takeover amendments to an issuer's by-laws" denied).
178. 405 N.E.2d 131 (Mass. 1980).
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served, "[iut was the shareholders . . . who decided that, absent
an affirmative recommendation by the directors, the proportion
of the vote required to approve a merger or consolidation proposal
should be increased," 8 ' and they retained the power to lower the
voting requirement if they should determine the by-law was no
longer "in their best interest" or that of the company."'
Two Delaware cases, Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., and
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. ,' invalidated the use of by-
law amendments that gave incumbent management inequitable ad-
vantages in proxy contests with dissident shareholder groups. In
Lerman, the amended by-laws had provisions "which left the date
of the annual meeting to the discretion of the board of directors"186
and that information on the slate of candidates being nominated
for director, by other than management, be presented in writing
to "the secretary of the corporation. . . 'not less than seventy days
prior to any meeting of stockholders called for the election of direc-
tors.' "187 The court held these by-laws invalid in that they oper-
ated "so as to prevent the plaintiff and his group from placing
the names of their candidates in nomination."188 In Schnell,
management, in response to an imminent proxy contest, attempt-
ed to use a new provision in the Delaware Corporation Law to
amend the by-laws, thus reducing the time available before the
annual shareholders' meeting for dissident shareholders to engage
in a proxy contest.18 The court determined that "management...
attempted to utilize the corporate machinery and the Delaware
Law for the purpose of perpetuating itself in office [thus] obstruct-
ing the legitimate efforts of dissident stockholders in the exercise
of their rights to undertake a proxy contest against management.""9°
Even though management was in strict compliance with the legal
formalities in changing the by-law date, the court indicated "ine-
quitable action does not become permissible simply because it is
legally possible." 91
In FMC Corp. v. R. P. Scherer Corp. ," the plaintiffs alleged
the proposed by-law amendments, which included a super-majority
voting requirement for certain business combinations and a
182. Id. at 135.
183. Id.
184. 421 A.2d 906 (Del. Ch. 1980).
185. 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
186. 421 A.2d at 909.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 914.
189. 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971).
190. Id. at 439.
191. Id.
192. [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) § 98,800, at 94,091.
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category of "continuing directors" with the power to waive the
super-majority provision, when used in connection with the "DGF"
crown jewel option [permitting acquisition of Scherer's West Ger-
man subsidiary upon a change of control of Scherer management
in a hostile takeover], would make a hostile takeover impractical
if not impossible.193
In refusing to grant a preliminary injunction, the court indicat-
ed the tender offeror would be protected by the court, if it is later
determined that the veto power of Scherer's president was ille-
gally acquired. However, if the court determines the adoption of
the proposed amendments is valid, and as a result, the veto pow-
er is exercised to prevent consummation of the merger, thereby
frustrating the motivation for the tender offer, the tender offeror
would have no remedy. The "frustration, caused by the legitimate
actions of a business rival, would not constitute a legally cogniz-
able injury, let alone an irreparable injury such as would justify
the granting of a preliminary injunction.""' The court indicated
the sole remedy for the shareholders, claiming loss of an oppor-
tunity to tender their shares for a premium, is a post-transactions
suit for money damages. 5
Because management effectively controls the corporate proxy" 6
machinery, the presence of shark repellent provides untenable
power in the directors to the detriment of shareholders.17
Market forces that tend to encourage corporate executives to manage corporate property in terms of
shareholders' best interests take on added significance in light of the difficulties plaintiffs face in vin-
dicating shareholders' rights through lawsuits against corporate managers .... The potential court
costs and attorney's fees involved in bringing a lawsuit combined with the presumption courts accord
the sound business decisions of corporate directors may reduce the viability of a suit for breach of
fiduciary duty as a means of encouraging executives to manage corporate property in shareholders'
best interest and correspondingly increase the importance the market for corporate control plays in
protecting shareholders' interest."
Since the presence of shark repellent is more likely to inure
to the benefit of management, unless the measures are clearly set
193. Id. at 94,092-94,093.
194. Id. at 94,095.
195. Id.
196. Christy, supra note 25, at I11.
Thus, even if the principals (the stockholders) are aware that the agent (management) is primarily
seeking to benefit itself at their expense, there is little chance that management will lose con-
trol unless its actions cause financial failure or depress the price of the corporations' stock
to the point that the corporation becomes an attractive tender offer candidate.
Id.
See Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 31, at 1171. "Shareholders routinely vote for managers or pay no
attention to elections. Successful campaigns against managers are rare, and they seldom succeed even if one
dissident shareholder holds a large block of stock that he can vote in his own favor."
197. Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 31, at 1181. "Dissatisfied shareholders are more likely to sell
their stock than attempt to change the corporation's bylaws or otherwise oppose managements." Id.
198. Note, supra note 150, at 1131 n.58.
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forth to protect the interests of all shareholders during a tender
offer, management's advocacy of shark repellent is a breach of
the fiduciary duty owed the corporation and its shareholders. Since
the judiciary has been reluctant to protect shareholders from
management's breach of duty,"' an effective check on manage-
ment's use of shark repellent would be full disclosure of the an-
titakeover provisions to the investing public, thus permitting the
market place to control the potential for abuse by management.2"'
Greenmail
When all other defensive strategies fail, or (depending upon
the reputation of the "corporate raider") as soon as management
determines a tender offer is imminent, management may perceive
its best approach is to buy out the interest of the bidder.2"1 Such
a use by management of corporate funds, generally in the mil-
lions of dollars, 2 solely to perpetuate its control of the corpora-
tion (disregarding the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders) is an egregious breach of management's fiduciary
199. Lautzenhiser, supra note 166, at 501-02. "The courts have declined to examine such issues as whether
defensive charter and by-law provisions create an inherent conflict of interest of corporate managers or whether
they violate the rights of majority shareholders by permitting minority shareholders to thwart corporate trans-
actions favored by the majority." Id.
200. Lautzenhiser, supra note 166, at 510.
Accordingly, the existence of shark repellent provisions in a corporation's charter or by-laws
will be reflected in the market price of its stock if adequate information concerning these meas-
ures has been disseminated in the marketplace. Corporations which do not have defensive pro-
visions in their charters or by-laws will be rewarded in the securities markets, while corporations
which adopt provisions that do not benefit investors should experience a decline in the market
price of their stock and become even more attractive takeover candidates.
Id.
See Steinberg, supra note 61, at 209. ("If -such disclosure is made, the shareholder generally
will receive all the information he needs in order to make an informed investment or voting decision.")
201. Rock, supra note 11, at 3.
From a tactical point of view, one of the easiest and cheapest ways to get rid of a greenmailer
is to buy him out right at the very beginning - however repugnant that may be. The reason:
The greenmailer attracts a lot of players - 'hot money' - who want to ride his coattails and
see a company put up for grabs.
Id.
202. Williams and McCoy, Phillips, Icahn Reach Agreement To End Hostile Takeover Offer, Wall St.
J., Mar. 5, 1985, at 20 col. 1 & 2. "Mr. Pickens dropped his bid [for control] but his group still holds 8.9
million Phillips shares.... Selling the shares back to Phillips at $53 apiece would produce a pre-tax profit
of $89 million." Id.; see Demott, supra note 11, at 65.
After a long battle with Disney management, [Saul Steinberg] sold the stock to the company
for $32 million more than he had [given] for it .... Just before Disney, Steinberg green-
mailed Quaker State Oil Refining, buying 8.9% of the firm on the open market and then sell-
ing it back to the company. His profit: $10.5 million.
Id.
"Icahn's record is impressive: since 1968 he had more than $100 million in the takeover games." Id. at 65.
Williams, supra note 153, at 674. "The largest case considered to be greenmail involved Texaco Inc.'s
buy-hack of a 9.9 percent stake of its stock from the Bass Brothers of Fort Worth, TX, for $1.28 billion, although
the brothers hadn't made any publicly known threat that they were seeking Texaco." Id.; see also Greene and
Junewicz, supra note 1, at 729. The SEC "Advisory Committee was particularly troubled by the greenmail
practice. As a result, it recommended prohibiting a target company from repurchasing its stock at a premium
unless the stock was held for at least two years or unless the target's directors secured prior approval of its
shareholders." Id.
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duty. Because of the potential for abuse, the author believes the
deference accorded to management decisions under the business
judgment rule is inappropriate, and greenmail payments should
be subjected to judicial scrutiny, in which the actions of the board
are measured by standards appropriate for a fiduciary. In the
author's view, greenmail is a practice that should be prohibited,
unless the directors can meet the burden of showing, by clear and
convincing evidence the following:
1. the use of greenmail was primarily for a corporate purpose...
in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders, and/or
2. the use of greenmail was in the public interest204 because of
the nature of the corporate enterprise;
3. the premium paid was a "reasonable" valuation of the con-
trol interest... repurchased; and
4. the payment of greenmail did not result in corporate waste,
either from the amount of the premium paid, or from the amount
203. See Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 504, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964) ("if the board has acted solely
or primarily because of the desire to perpetuate themselves in office, the use of corporate funds" to buy-out
a dissident shareholder "is improper"); see also Kullgren v. Navy Gas & Supply Co., 110 Colo. 454, 465,
135 P.2d 1007, 1012 (1943) ("directors of a corporation cannot lawfully issue treasury stock ... for the pur-
pose of gaining control of the corporation without giving the other stockholders an opportunity to subscribe");
Kaplan v. Goldsmat, 380 A.2d 556, 569 (Del. Ch. 1977) ("use of corporate funds to acquire the shares of
a dissident stockholder faction is a proper exercise of business judgment where it is done to eliminate what
appears to be a clear threat to the future business or the existing, successful business policy of a company
and is not accomplished for the sole or primary purpose of perpetuating the control of management"); Petty
v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140, 143 (Del. Ch. 1975) (temporarily enjoining use of corporate funds
for selective redemption of preferred stock for the "sole and improper purpose of perpetuating" incumbent manage-
ment); Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 20, 187 A.2d 405, 408 (1962) (management's repurchase of shares
with corporate funds, solely to retain control, is improper); Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 55, 158 A.2d
136, 141 (1960) ("directors may validly spend corporate funds for the defense of corporate policy in a proxy
fight"); Andersen v. Albert & J.M. Anderson Mfg. Co., 325 Mass. 343, 346-47, 90 N.E.2d 541, 544 (1950)
(directors breach their fiduciary duties when they "manipulate the issue and purchase" of corporate stock to
maintain and perpetuate their control of the corporation); Hendricks v. Mill Engineering & Supply Co., 68
Wash. 2d 490, 494-95, 413 P.2d 811, 813 (1966), citing Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (1960)
(the court stated that "directors... may in the exercise of their honest business judgment adopt a valid method
of eliminating what appears to them a clear threat to the future of their business by any lawful means"); cf
Martin v. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 234, 245, 92 A.2d 295, 302 (1952) (Absent fraud
or unfairness, "[wie see no sound reason why it should be held as a matter of law that the method of reducing
capital by purchasing shares at private sale for retirement may not be invoked simply because the purpose
or motive of the reduction is to eliminate a substantial number of shares held by a stockholder at odds with
management policy").
204. Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1094 (10th Cir. 1972) ("A corporation publishing a newspaper"
has an obligation to the public, and not just to making a profit).
205. Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. at 506, 199 A.2d at 555.
lit is elementary that a holder of a substantial number of shares would expect to receive the
control premium as part of his selling price, and if the corporation desired to obtain the stock,
it is unreasonable to expect that the corporation could avoid paying what any other purchaser
would be required to pay for the stock.
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of debt"0 6 incurred, to enable the corporation to finance its ability
to remain "independent."
In Cheff v. Mathes,"°7 the target board investigated the finan-
cial and business history of Maremont and corporations under his
control, and determined he had a reputation as a "liquidator." Cheff
testified:
we have 8500 men, direct employees, so the problem is entirely different. He indicated immediately
that he had no interest in that type of distribution, that he didn't think it was modern, that he felt fur-
naces could be sold as he sold mufflers, through a half a dozen salesmen in a wholesome way.-
The court indicated "directors satisfy their burden by showing
good faith and reasonable investigation; the directors will not be
penalized for an honest mistake of judgment, if the judgment ap-
peared reasonable at the time the decision was made." From the
evidence on the record below, the court determined:
the board of directors, based upon direct investigation, receipt of professional advice, and personal
observations of the contradictory action of Maremont and his explanation of corporate purpose, be-
lieved, with justification, that there was a reasonable threat to the continued existence of Holland, or
at least existence in its present form, by the plan of Maremont to continue building up his stockholdings.'
Since this was a "matter of business judgment,"11 the court found
no justification for attaching personal liability on the directors for
approving the repurchase of the bidder's shares at premium.
Although the plaintiffs in Kors v. Carey.. alleged the repur-
chase was for an improper purpose of continuing control of in-
cumbent management, the court determined plaintiffs had not met
their burden of "overcoming the presumption that directors form
their judgment in good faith." 13 Nor did plaintiffs establish that
a director, acknowledged to be the one with the most to gain from
maintaining the status quo, "so dominated the board that its non-
managerial members were unable to make their own decisions
about the purchase under attack.""' Thus, the more flexible Dela-
ware rule is supportive of management repurchasing corporate
stock from a would be acquiror where the directors are motivat-
ed by a desire to "eliminate what appears to them a clear threat
206. Williams and McCoy, supra note 202, at 3, col. I & 2.
For Mr. Icahn, the peace pact and the debt swap plan will mean more than $100 million in
profit on his Phillips holdings and in payment for expenses tied to his acquisition bid. The
moves appear to assure Phillips of remaining independent, but the price is steep: Phillips' debt
will nearly triple under the swap to about $7.3 billion, making it by far the most highly lever-
aged major oil company in the U.S.
Id.
207. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
208. Id. at 500, 199 A.2d at 551.
209. Id. at 506, 199 A.2d at 555.
210. Id. at 508, 199 A.2d at 556.
211. Id. at 508, 199 A.2d at 556-57.
212. 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (1960).
213. Id. at 56, 39 A.2d at 142.
214. Id. at 56-57, 39 A.2d at 142. See supra text accompanying notes 46-55.
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to the future of their business."' 1
One commentator has asserted that greenmail payoffs may be
considered to be "artificial and therefore manipulative under
Mobil,"6 because the repurchase at a premium has the effect of
artificially decreasing the price of the corporation's stock since
the demand precipitated by the hostile tender offer is no longer
present." 7
Recognizing that the authority to repurchase corporate stock
is vested in directors by state corporation statutes, one commen-
tator asserts that, because of the potential for abuse attendant in
repurchase programs (e.g., substantial increase in management's
percentage holdings, creation of veto power in management, etc.),
repurchase "should be subject to shareholder approval following
full disclosure of control consequences."28
Tender Offers and Management Resistance
Taken individually, each of the resistance measures noted above
presents situations where management's interests are diametrically
opposed to those of the corporation's shareholders. When used
collectively as part of a well-coordinated strategy of resistance,21 9
the breach of management's fiduciary duty and the injury to share-
holders resulting from the breach cannot be easily protected by
the business judgment rule, or viewed as immune from judicial
scrutiny because courts have no expertise in management.
Generally, tender offers are seen as beneficial to the capital mar-
kets and the economy of the United States as a whole.
Tender offers are a method of monitoring the work of management teams. Prospective bidders moni-
tor the performance of managerial teams by comparing a corporation's potential value with its value
(as reflected by share prices) under current management. When the difference between the market
215. Comment, Herald Co. v. Seawell: A New Corporate Social Responsibility?, 121 U. PA. L. Rv.
1157, 1160 (1973) quoting Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 55, 158 A.2d 136, 141 (1960).
The jurisdictions that follow the Delaware rule have approved purchases by a corporation of
its own shares to prevent the election of new directors, where the existing board feared that
the new directors would sacrifice an established mode of doing business to quick profits, to
the future detriment of the corporation; adopt sales practices that would be unsatisfactory for
the corporation's product line; order a quick and untimely liquidation; manipulate the affairs
of the company for their own profit; or remove key personnel.
Id.
216. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
217. Comment, supra note 148, at 1163.
218. Cohn, supra note 71, at 525. Although shareholder approval in the tender offer context might be
more difficult to obtain, a repurchase by management occurring under routine circumstances is likely to en-
counter no serious challenge. Id.
219. Each of these measures, whether taken prior to or concurrent with pending hostile offers, is
couched in terms of safeguarding corporate and shareholder interests. Management's role in
the initiation and pursuance of defensive measures is defined at times by fiduciary concepts,
at other times by reference to the statutory management powers of directors, and on occasion
by resort to economic theory.
Id. at 490.
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price of a firm's shares and the price those shares might have under different circumstances becomes
too great, an outsider can profit by buying the firm and improving its management . . . . The source
of the premium is the reduction in agency costs, which makes the firm's assets worth more in the hands
of the acquirer than they were worth in the hands of the firm's managers ....
[S]hareholders benefit even if their corporation never is the subject of a tender offer. The process of
monitoring by outsiders poses a continuous threat of takeover if performance lags. Managers will at-
tempt to reduce agency costs in order to reduce the chance of takeover, and the process of reducing
agency costs leads to higher prices for shares.-
An increase in the practice of acquiring corporations by tender
offer rather than merger has been prompted in part by economic
factors that have resulted in the stock of target corporations trad-
ing well below their value;2. the relative ease with which financ-
ing the acquisition can be arranged;'m and, in the opinion of Harold
M. Williams, former chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the perception of acquiring corporation management
that larger conglomerate enterprises are a testament to their
managerial acumen, thereby offering greater opportunities to fulfill
management's needs for power and ego satisfaction." 3
The tender offer can be analogized to a one-on-one private trans-
action to acquire stock. "What transforms [this] private, relative-
ly unregulated . . . transaction into a tender offer subject to
Williams Act provisions and to a host of adverse target manage-
ment reactions is the extension of the offer to all shareholders
with the consequent potentiality of a shift in control in the target
company." " The Williams Act was enacted to protect investors
by providing for disclosure of the intentions of the tender offeror
and a response from target management, thereby providing in-
220. Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 31, at 1173-74; see, Easterbrook and Jarrell, supra note 27,
at 281. "[Tlargets' shareholders lose when managers defeat tender offers."; cf. Williams, supra note 1, at
82,875-82,876. But see Lautzenhiser, supra note 166, at 508. "[It is unclear whether takeovers are per se
beneficial to shareholders, the national economy or the national securities markets. Neither the Congress nor
the [SEC] should act to protect a process whose value to the national economy is not yet proven.".
221. Williams, supra note I, at 82,876.
222. Prentice, supra note 70, at 337-38. "Given the large premiums offered to shareholders, it is not sur-
prising that a high percentage of hostile tender offers have succeeded.".
223. Williams, supra note 1, at 82,876.
The immediate results of a takeover are particularly attractive to a corporate executive who
seeks the ego satisfaction, prestige, and remuneration associated with size and the appearance
of growth. In contrast, the impact of investment spending on earnings, and the deferred nature
of its rewards, may not seem to be of benefit to current managers or fit with their short-term
time horizon in office.
Id.
See Christy, supra note 25, at 112.
Moreover, managerial compensation is more closely tied to total sales than to profitability,
while stockholders benefit only from profitability .... Because managers, who often effec-
tively set their own salaries, use company size as the basis of their compensation, there is
a danger that they will favor expansion without regard to profitability.
Id.
See also Christy, supra note 25, at 112-14, nn.31-33.
224. Cohn, supra note 71, at 510.
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formation necessary from which to make an informed decision
whether to tender shares to the bidder.223 Thus, the response of
target management under Rule 14e-2 is one of the following:
(I) a recommendation of acceptance or rejection of tender offer; (2) an expression of no opinion with
a decision to remain neutral towards the offer; or (3) that it is not able to take a position with respect
to bidder's offer. The rule 14e-2 statement must also include all reasons for the position taken, or the
stance of neutrality, as well as any explanation of the inability to take a position
2
6
Because offeror can exert tremendous pressure on shareholders
to tender, it is incumbent on target management to make its ex-
pertise and superior knowledge about the corporation available
to its shareholders to assist them in evaluating a tender offer.
However, this does not mean that the ultimate decision on whether
to tender is one that belongs to management. " " While the tender
decision may be seen as a function of the board of directors, "28
other commentators see this decision as one that belongs exclu-
sively to shareholders, " '9 in which defensive actions of manage-
225. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975).
226. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1986).
227. Cohn, supra note 71, at 513. "The differences . . . in knowledge and perspective between control
and noncontrol [sic] shareholders do not lead to the conclusion that the latter should not enjoy similar decision-
making [sic] roles. Differences in knowledge may well be ameliorated by disclosure, and the Williams Act
has encouraged a greater flow of information to shareholders." Id.; cf. Comment, supra note 148 at 1166.
An amendment to the Williams Act authorizing the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
to formulate rules dealing specifically with tender offer defenses and the inherent conflict of
interest would promote shareholder protection and counteract the conflict of interest. The fil-
ing requirement will protect the shareholders by informing them of why their directors are
defending against the takeover . . . .This will enable the shareholders to better scrutinize
the actions of their directors and will also provide an action for fraud against the directors
if the shareholders can prove the directors lied.
Id.
228. Williams, supra note 1, at 82,879. "Directors should make the decision, as they do all other corporate
policy decisions, and do so based on an assessment of the corporation as an institution with responsibilities
to discharge, rather than simply seeking the best deal for their shareholders." Id.
229. Johnson, supra note 149, at 59-60. "While it is true that the officers and directors of a corporation
are in a unique position of 'expertise' and 'knowledge' in corporate matters, the question remains whether a
tender offer is a corporate matter or a personal matter to be decided by the shareholders." Id.; see Cohn, supra
note 71, at 501.
The division of ownership and management in modem corporations has constricted the
sphere of shareholder action, with the rights to elect and alter management being perhaps the
last and most fundamental vestiges of shareholder authority . . . .A tender offer represents
an opportunity for a single shareholder to acquire sufficient shares to invoke the statutory pro-
visions available for a midstream change in management. Viewed in this perspective, con-
straints upon shareholder action must be seriously questioned, for there is no compelling basis
for preferring a grant of statutory authority to directors over a distinct grant of statutory authority
to shareholders.
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ment should not enjoy the protection of the business judgment
rule.
230
Commentators are divided on the effect of management
resistance to tender offers:
The result... has been polarization of opinion, ranging from the argument that directors breach their
fiduciary duty whenever they aggressively impede an offer from reaching shareholders to the position
that 'the ever-present fiduciary obligation of management .... justifies] taking such reasonable ac-
tion as they deem appropriate to frustrate or delay an unsolicited takeover attempt.'"'
Courts have tended to support management in its efforts to resist
the tender offer, regardless of the inherent conflict of interest.3 2
Thus, application of the business judgment rule is unwarranted
considering the ease with which management, assisted by capa-
ble counsel can rationalize actions that should properly be
scrutinized because of the presence of a conflict of interest.2 33 It
230. Johnson, supra note 149, at 61-62.
In the tender offer situation.... an offer to contract is really being made to the target compa-
ny's shareholders, thus making the tender offer situation clearly distinguishable from contract
negotiations between the corporation and unrelated third parties. In the latter situation the bus-
iness judgment of the directors should prevail since they have been elected to manage the af-
fairs of the corporation, but in the former situation they should have little direct involvement
since a tender offer involves only the affairs of the stockholders.
Id.
"Once management makes its objections and recommendations [as required by Rule 14e -2] know, it should
then remove itself from the tender offer process." Id. at 62-63; see Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 31,
at 1200.
The tender offer . . . is an essential safety valve to ensure that managers evaluate merger
proposals in the best interests of the shareholders. A legal rule that allowed the target's manage-
ment the same discretion in responding to a tender offer as it has in responding to a merger
proposal... would decrease the number of mergers as well as the number of tender offers,
because a valuable check on management would be lost.
Id.
231. Cohn, supra note 71, at 497.
232. Prentice, supra note 70, at 345.
In evaluating the legality and propriety of target management actions, the courts have used
two main tests. The 'primary purpose' test purports to invalidate target management action
only if it had the primary goal of maintaining control in management's hands. The second
test employed is the familiar 'business judgment' rule, which will sustain a defensive tactic
used for the primary purpose of maintaining control so long as a valid business purpose for
the action also exists.
Id.
See Cohn, supra note 71, at 477-78.
In the profusion of nebulous and conflicting standards, courts have been reluctant to find tar-
get management liability or to enjoin certain measures except in egregious circumstances where
defensive actions blatantly defy any justification other than the self-perpetuation of incumbent
management. The relative ease by which management may create a patina of legitimacy for
defensive measures results in even further constriction of judicial relief.
Id.
233. Id. at 499-500. See Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 31, at 1175. In fact, because of its domina-
tion of the corporate proxy machinery [n. 197 supra], management - unlike shareholders - is in a no-lose posi-
tion when a bidder makes a tender offer. If management is successful in its efforts to resist the offer through
defensive tactics, or to buy out the bidder with greenmail, it retains its corporate position, power, prestige,
and pecuniary benefit attendant with its perpetuation of corporation control. See Note, supra note 150, at 1130-31.
If it is successful in resisting the tender offer, it merely bails out in its lucrative golden parachute; at any rate,
any premium shareholders may have received if they could have tendered their shares to the bidder is lost.
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has been argued that this application of the business judgment rule
does not meet the needs of shareholders, whose interests become
secondary to a management in its pursuit of its own interest. As
such, "[t]he rule should be amended to shift the burden of proof
to management to demonstrate that the defensive tactics employed
were in the best interests of the shareholders. In addition,
procedural devices, such as requiring outside directors to approve
of defensive maneuvers, should be encouraged."2"
Other commentators assert management resistance is harmful
to shareholder interest. "It does not matter how one looks at defeat-
ed tender offers. Any method that takes into account the move-
ment of the stock market shows that managers who resist tender
offers to the point of defeating them do a grave disservice to their
investors."2"5
Because of the development of management science, that can
provide guidance in ascertaining whether management actions
taken are consistent with recognized principles, it is no longer
necessary or appropriate for courts to abdicate their responsibili-
ty to provide judicial scrutiny to protect shareholders, where
management engages in other than obvious self-dealing that is a
conflict of interest, by according to management the deference
Cf., Johnson, supra note 149, at 67.
If courts limit permissible director action once a tender is announced to the making of
recommendations of shareholders, then any additional actions taken by the board, including
the grant of lock-up and share purchase options, should be subject to shareholder suit in state
court with a judicial scrutiny that is free of the business judgment rule. In addition, if these
actions result in artificial ceilings on tender prices and inhibit competitive bids, the target com-
pany's board of directors should be held liable for violation of the Williams Act. In both situa-
tions, the directors should be held responsible and accountable to the shareholders for any
economic loss suffered as a result of their actions.
Id.
234. Prentice, supra note 70, at 360.
235. Easterbrook and Jarrell, supra note 27, at 291-92. But see, Cohn, supra note 71, at 508-09.
Acquiring companies are prepared to pay substantial premiums for target shares presumably
because they foresee an ability to create a more productive use of assets that exists under tar-
get management .... Defensive measures are thus regarded as contrary to economic efficien-
cy because they hinder the ability of shareholders to remove inefficient management and preclude
obtaining the greatest return on shareholder investment. Despite the economists' delight in
empirical evidence, there is a paucity of evidence in the tender offer context to support any
particular economic theory. Dispositive data as to the desirability of any one economic per-
spective could scarcely be expected given the unavoidably speculative nature of judgments
regarding the desirability of a particular takeover, and the vicissitudes of economic and mar-
ket conditions following a successful defense to a tender offer.
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of the business judgment rule.2"6
During the tender offer process, directors of the acquiring cor-
poration also owe similar duties of care and loyalty to their share-
holders. Acquiring corporation directors are also susceptible to
make tender offers for the underlying purpose of self-aggrandizing
empire building. " 7 Academicians have observed that the evidence
does not support that the primary objectives of mergers attained
through tender offers - "greater economies of scale and produc-
tivity, increased profitability and improved stock performance -
are being attained to any significant degree."" 8 Moreover, it has
been suggested that management's support for acquisitions exists
due to management's lack of personal risk: "[b]ecause manage-
ment often has little invested in the enterprise, it has little to lose,
even in salary, if the speculation fails, but much to gain if is
succeeds." 39
Recognizing that the acquiring board must assure itself that the
acquisition it seeks in the tender offer is "in the best interests of
the corporation and its shareholders, " '2 and that the procedures
236. Christy, supra note 25, at 169-70.
During the last sixty years, business management has become a nearly scientific discipline
with a set of generally recognized principles concerning an accepted practice of business manage-
ment. It is the violation of these principles by management, not the effects of unforeseeable
or unavoidable adverse factors, that causes the great mass of business failures.
Id. at 129.
See Greene and Junewicz, supra note 1, at 716.
Because the judgment of directors is undeniably affected by their high professional and finan-
cial stake in the outcome of an acquisition contest, and the current bias against any uninvited
bidder challenging the right of a company to be independent, it is apparent that there must
be some new understanding of the good faith element of the business judgment rule.
Id.
See Johnson, supra note 149, at 64.
[I]f management is responsible for frivolous litigation or other actions that result in withdraw-
al of the offer, it should be open to shareholder suit. More importantly, the shareholders should
be entitled to a jury's determination of the propriety of the directors' actions free of the presump-
tions created by the business judgment rule.
Id.
237. But see Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 31, at 1185.
Another argument against tender offers portrays them as reducing the welfare of the share-
holders of the acquirers by more than the premium paid to the target's shareholders. In this
view, tender offers represent self-aggrandizing empire building by acquiring managers who
err in deciding what ftrtms to acquire or what price to pay . .. .A corporation headed by
an empire-building management team that did not maximize profits would fare poorly in the
product market and would have lower share prices; its managers would fare poorly in the
employment market. The corporation itself would become a takeover candidate.
Id.
Cf Christy, supra note 25, at 107. "Although unforeseeable events and uncontrollable external forces do
occasionally cause business failures, '[m]ost [business] authorities agree that management is the major cause
of financial failure.'"
238. Greene and Junewicz, supra note 1, at 733. "State law permits the offer to be financed, commenced
and consummated with the approval of the bidder's shareholders." Id.
239. Christy, supra note 25, at 115. "A risk adverse management fears exceptional results in any given
year because it doubts its ability to sustain such performance and wants to avoid having to explain ups and
downs in earnings to shareholders. A risk adverse management may expand the corporation to secure 'stabili-
ty.'" Id.
240. Williams, supra note 1, at 82,879.
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were in compliance with applicable law, former SEC Chairman
Williams asserts this is an area where independent directors must
exercise the greatest responsibility, in order to protect the interests
of the corporation and its shareholders.
[T]he independent directors must be sensitive to the possibility that management's judgment may be
skewed in a particular case .... Therefore, to a large extent, it is the independent directors' responsi-
bility to satisfy themselves that such an acquisition makes substantive long-term good sense for the
company .... The directors should consider management's prior experiences and track record or
its lack of them in assessing and acquiring target companies, integrating new acquisitions into the cor-
poration, and delivering the anticipated benefits.
Additionally, in the case of a hostile tender offer in which the bidder does not have access to much
critical information about the target, directors should also consider whether it has a sufficient basis
for determining the value of the target company and whether that company can be successfully in-
tegrated into the acquiring corporation.-"
Williams recommends that the acquiring board, in its exami-
nation of alternatives to the tender offer, should also consider
whether corporate excess cash might not be better expended in
a distribution to its shareholders, rather than to the shareholders
of a target corporation."'
Thus, for many of the same reasons that application of the bus-
iness judgment rule is inappropriate for target management who
impose resistive measures when confronted with a tender offer,
it is also an inappropriate standard of judicial scrutiny for acquir-
ing corporation board action in initiating a tender offer. Prior to
1919, there was a basis for the courts' reliance on the business
judgment rule.
It was more complex.., to determine if corporate management had acted carefully, diligently, skill-
fully, and prudently in regard to such matters as financing the enterprise, marketing its products, es-
tablishing credit policies, declaring dividends, or expanding the enterprise. Nor were there recognized
and well established rules, standard procedures, guidelines, or techniques that courts could look to,
through expert testimony, to determine if managerial actions relating to risky activities were justified
or prudent, or if managerial decisions had been made carefully, in accordance with established princi-
ples and practices."'
In making the fiduciary duty of management analogous to that
of the common law trustee, courts presumed that management
and shareholder goals in the publicly held corporation were sin-
gular, and that the types of conflict of interest inherent in the cor-
porate setting were similar to those of the trustee."
When courts originally formulated the duty of loyalty, they did not understand the stockholders' in-
vestment objective or recognize conflicting personal goals of management. Since courts did not under-
241. Id. at 82,879. "[T]he large premiums that have been paid in certain recent acquisitions make one
wonder how carefully the bidding corporation's board considered the economic justification for the transac-
tion." Id.
242. Id. at 82,880.
243. Christy, supra note 25, at 123.
244. Id. at 122.
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stand the principles of valuation or the concept of opportunity costs, they could not recognize that
shareholders were suffering losses even though the corporation might be showing an accounting profit.
Consequendy, courts adopted the convenient valid business purpose rule, which kept them from mak-
ing speculative inquiries into management's motives when there seemed to be no rational basis for
doing so."'
Thus, where shareholders can show by expert analysis that
tender offer acquisitions were not made in the best interests of
the corporation and eroded the market value of the shareholders'
investment," 6 the courts should not shield management with the
valid business purpose or business judgment rule, but should in-
stead require management to show that its actions were within
the recognized standards and managerial practice in the particu-
lar industry." 7
III. A PROPOSED FIDUCIARY STANDARD FOR THE RESOLUTION OF
DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' INHERENT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.
The transfer of corporate control does not occur in a vacuum,
as the decision has the potential of affecting the interest not only
of shareholders of the corporations directly involved in the trans-
action, but also of employees, the economic and tax base of the
surrounding community, and suppliers. Depending upon the size
of the corporations involved and their domination of the market,
the ramifications can be wide reaching throughout the national
economy. Considering the legitimacy of the concerns of those af-
fected by tender offers, there is nonetheless, no unanimity of opin-
ion on resolution of the ultimate issue: To whom does the board
of directors owe a fiduciary duty in the context of a tender offer?
This section will examine the duties of directors and officers when
confronted with conflicts inherent in a tender offer, the duties of
majority or controlling stockholders in the context of greenmail,
245. Id. at 124-25. "Like the business judgment rule, the valid business purpose rule today serves not only
to shield management from speculative inquiries into its motives but also to shield management from liability
for disloyalty that can be proved." Id.
246. Id. at 159. "[If] management intentionally fails to increase the stockholders' wealth and instead fur-
thers its personal goals, then management intentionally causes at least an economic business failure." Id.
247. Id. at 129. "For jurists to ignore these disciplines is to perpetuate unsound business practices, protect
economic waste, and encourage what is often little better than the theft of stockholders' wealth. In short, such
neglect makes corporate managers a class privileged to do wrong."Id.; cf id. at 171. "A better view is that
shareholders are on notice only of unavoidable and unforeseeable risk, as determined by recognized business
principles. This rule supplies enough certainty that capable managers would not likely be discouraged from
practicing their trade, any more than physicians, accountants, and engineers are discouraged.". But see Com-
ment, The Proposed Restatement of Corporate Governance. Is Reform Really Necessary?, 11 PEPPERDINE L.
REv. 499, 504 (Mar. 1984)
The proposal requires the directors not only to carry out their responsibilities in good faith
and in a manager thought to be in the best interests of the corporation, but also to perform
their duties with the degree of care that an ordinary prudent person would reasonably be ex-
pected to exercise in a similar position, under similar circumstances. This standard of care
would curtail the "business judgment rule" which currently requires a director to use only good
faith, and would hold him liable only for gross negligence.
Id.
"Good faith should be the only restraint on a director in making corporate decisons." Id. at 518.
19871
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and propose a fiduciary standard for resolution of each of these
inherent conflicts.
THE TENDER OFFER: DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' DUTIES
One viewpoint suggests the fiduciary duty is not only owed to
the shareholders but also to the corporation's other constituen-
cies. "Mergers and acquisitions also affect the welfare of the com-
munity in which the target company conducts its operations ..
. Courts have determined that these interests may warrant legal
protection in the takeover context as well as in other, more general
contexts."" 8
In addition to analyzing the offeror's terms, the board of directors has an institutional responsibility
to consider such concerns as: the potential adverse impact on employees, suppliers, and communities;
and likely anti-trust limitations; whether the offer is for less than all outstanding securities, which raises
the specter of a residual minority which may be locked into their investments; and any likely discon-
tinuation of unique goods or services to the public. The key ... is the substance as contrasted to the
window dressing and the rhetoric used to dress-up [an] otherwise unjustified defense.'"
Another commentator has observed that the long-standing rule
that corporations have as their primary purpose to create profit
for shareholders seems to have been tempered in Herald Co. v.
Seawell,25" "the first judicial assertion that corporate management
has an obligation to operate its business in a socially responsible
manner.""2 ' The court in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. ," was une-
quivocal in its assertion that the purpose of the corporate enter-
prise is profit.'
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The
powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of the directors is to be exer-
cised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to
the reduction of profits, or to the non-distribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote
them to other purposes."'
248. Greene and Junewicz, supra note 1, at 734. "The directors of the target of the bid unquestionably
have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of shareholders. Far less clear is their responsibility and authori-
ty to protect the interests of employees and suppliers who may have a significant economic stake in the result-
ing business combination." Id. at 733. But See, Cohn, supra note 71, at 513.
Concerns expressed for employee, customer, and community interests are protected by two
independent sources: target management's injunctive efforts and the acquiring company's eco-
nomic concerns. The former, however selfishly pursued, may raise issues of waste, looting,
and illegality analogous to concerns relevant to a majority shareholder's transference of con-
trol. Even more protective of such interests, and frequently overlooked in discussions regard-
ing the feared consequences of takeovers, are the economic interests of the acquiring company
that may and probably will be quite inimical to substantial disruptions in employee morale,
supplier and trade relationships, and the nonproductive use of acquired assets.
Id.
249. Williams, supra note 1, at 82,881.
250. 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972).
251. Comment, supra note 215, at 1157. "The Herald Co. court suggested in broad dicta that directors
may cause their corporation to purchase its own shares to prevent an outsider from taking control of the corpo-
ration, if the board fears that the outsider will not operate the corporation in the best interests of the public." Id.
252. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
253. Id. at 507, 170 N.W. at 684.
254. Id.
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In a challenge to the policy of the management of the Chicago
National League Ball Club, Inc. ("Cubs") of refusing to install
lights at Wrigley Field, in order for the team to schedule night
baseball on its home field, the court in Shlensky v. Wrigley..
declined to base its judgment solely on the interests of stock-
holders. Although the plaintiff alleged the decision not to install
lights was motivated by Wrigley's "personal opinions 'that base-
ball is a "daytime sport" and that the installation of lights and night
baseball will have deteriorating effect upon the surrounding neigh-
borhood,' "26 the court indicated that the plaintiff had not estab-
lished that such motivation was "contrary to the best interests of
the corporation and the stockholders."2"
[Ilt appears to us that the effect on the surrounding neighborhood might well be considered by a direc-
tor who was considering the patrons who would or would not attend the games if the park were in
a poor neighborhood. Furthermore, the long run interest of the corporation in its property value at
Wrigley Field might demand all efforts to keep the neighborhood from deteriorating." '
The court indicated this decision was one within the proper scope
of the directors' discretion,259 and the "[court] may not decide these
questions in the absence of a clear showing of dereliction of duty
on the part of the specific directors and a mere failure to 'follow
the crowd' is not such a dereliction. "26 More recently, the Chica-
go Tribune, owner of the Cubs, sought to have lights installed
at Wrigley Field, thus permitting night baseball at the only park
in either league that has no night baseball. The Cook County Cir-
cuit Court determined lifting the ban on night baseball at Wrigley
Field would have a detrimental impact on the local residential
neighborhood surrounding the ballpark. "61
The Tenth Circuit in Herald,26 2 apparently considered the spe-
cial role of the press in articulating that the fiduciary duties of
directors of corporations publishing newspapers are threefold:
"to the stockholders, to the employees and to the public.'263 The
court determined the repurchase of corporate stock and establish-
ment of an employee stock trust were done for a proper corporate
purpose, and not solely to remain "independent" at all costs. On
255. 95 111. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968).
256. Id. at 176, 237 N.E.2d at 778.
257. Id. at 180, 237 N.E.2d at 780.
258. Id. at 180-81, 237 N.E.2d at 780.
259. Id. at 181, 237 N.E.2d at 780.
260. Id. at 183, 237 N.E.2d at 781.
261. Maddocks, Don't take me out to the ballgame at night, Christian Science Monitor, reprinted in Jack-
son Daily News, Apr. 10, 1985, at 15A, col. 1.
262. 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972).
263. Id. at 1091.
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the record below, the court found sufficient evidence to support
the trial court findings of fact that
Itihe directors knew about Newhouse's purchase of control of more than a dozen newspapers. They
feared that a Newhouse take over would have an adverse impact on the character and quality of the
Post. They believed local independent ownership preferable to chain ownership, particularly if that
local independent ownership was in the image and tradition of the Bonf'ls history and development,
as well as the history of the Denver Post.'"
The court indicated corporations publishing newspapers have ob-
ligations to the public - its readers - and are required to operate
in the "public interest"." "The readers are entitled to a high quality
of accurate news coverage of local, state, national, and interna-
tional events. The newspaper management has an obligation to
assume leadership, when needed, for the betterment of the area
served by the newspaper."2
The court noted the motive of the Post management in estab-
lishing its employee stock plan was to "benefit the public, the cor-
poration and the employees."6 7 Consideration of the interests of
employees is appropriate because these professionals and highly
skilled craftsmen make the daily publication of the Post possi-
ble. 168 The court also determined the concern of the management
of the Post for its employees was a long-standing policy, and not
a tactic to resist the tender offer and thus retain its "indepen-
dence." 269
Another viewpoint is that in the consideration of a tender offer,
the board owes its fiduciary duty only to the shareholders, and
that the shareholders are entitled to have their agent represent their
interests with undivided loyalty.
So long as it continues to be lawful to form corporations for profit, shareholders are entitled to hire
managers dedicated to the shareholders' interest alone. The duty of management is to operate efficient-
ly and thus maximize the return to shareholders. Maximization of shareholders' wealth ultimately works
to the advantage of workers and suppliers, because shareholders gain only from the firm's mutually
beneficial transactions with those persons. A manager responsible to two conflicting interests is in
fact answerable to neither. A principle of divided loyalty ultimately would harm everyone by reducing
the willingness of people to entrust their money to managers.
2
'
Fiduciary Standard: Tender Offers
In evaluating conduct of the board of directors in the context
of a tender offer, the concept of fiduciary duty should be primary.
264. Id. at 1092.
265. Id. at 1094-95.
266. Id. at 1095.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. Compare with Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 ("A board may have regard for various constituencies
in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.").
270. Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 31, at 1191-92.
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"The fiduciary cannot use his power for personal advantage, to
the detriment of shareholders and creditors, no matter how abso-
lute his power is perceived to be and no matter how meticulous
the fiduciary is to satisfy technical requirements."271 It is impor-
tant to recognize that as long as management and ownership in
the publicly-held corporation is separated, management has an
inherent conflict of interest with the duties of care and loyalty
owed to the corporation's shareholders.
It is also necessary to acknowledge that there is no such actor
as a "disinterested" director; whether one is an inside or outside
target corporation director, there is some "benefit" (e.g., status,
power, salary and bonus, enhanced reputation for managerial ex-
pertise, corporate "perks," opportunity for one's company to do
business with the target corporation, etc.) to be gained from one's
continued participation as a member of the board of directors.
Furthermore, outside directors are said to face a dilemma of oper-
ating either as "activists" independent of management, or in their
traditional role as management's "rubber stamp." "Aggressive
directors run the risk of being labeled troublemakers and of los-
ing a vital network of business contacts. Rubber-stamp directors
take an even bigger gamble - that they will be sued for not properly
looking after shareholder interests."2" In responding to the increas-
ing cost of liability coverage and as a means of removing an im-
pediment to the corporation attracting qualified outside directors,
the Delaware legislature enacted Section 102(b)(7). "7" This sta-
tute only limits a cause of action for damages in direct and deriva-
tive actions for breach of the duty of care. The limitation on
liability would not affect legal remedies for breach of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty,"" which may arise where directors have a con-
flict of interest with the corporate entity and shareholders, which
is heightened in the takeover context. Thus, in the tender offer
271. Johnson, supra note 149, at 68-69.
[W]hile fiduciary duties are elastic and the liability of an officer or director varies directly
with the culpability of his conduct, some anti-takeover defensive tactics are by definition at-
tempts to deprive shareholders of potential takeover profits. As such, these tactics constitute
such clear breaches of fiduciary duty that they should not survive a shareholder action for breach.
Id.
272. Id. at 69; see Baum, The Job Nobody Wants, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 8, 1986, at 56 ("[Tlhere are
a lot of so-called outside directors who are not all that independent: They are close friends of the chief execu-
tive or perhaps of the company's banker, lawyer, or management consultant"); see also Dynamics Corporation
of America, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) § 92,768 at 93,760 (judicial review of the decisions of directors made
in a takeover context "is not without its costs. It makes directors overcautious, makes people reluctant to serve
as directors, drives up directors' fees and officers' and directors' liability insurance rates, and leads boards
of directors to adopt ponderous, court-like procedures. But the price is one the courts have been willing to
pay.") Judge Posner's opinion also recognized "so-called outsiders moreover are often friends of the insiders.
And since they spend only part of their time on the affairs of the corporation, their knowledge of those affairs
is much less than that of the insiders, to whom they are likely therefore to defer." Id.
273. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) 1974 (Supp. 1986).
274. Id.
19871
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
context, the state law claim for breach of fiduciary duties should
be available to provide relief to injured shareholder-plaintiffs, and
to discourage development of divided loyalties of directors and
officers who, as corporate fiduciaries, manage the entity for share-
holders.
Therefore, where the decision of the board is one that deals
specifically with matters of corporate policy that can be justified
on some basis consistent with modem principles of management,
courts may accord to the board the presumption of good faith in-
herent in the business judgment rule, and place the burden of prov-
ing otherwise on plaintiff-shareholders.
However, where the decision of the board is one that is related
to a tender offer (regardless of whether any indication of an im-
pending tender offer exists), it is the author's view that courts
should recognize the nature of activities that suggest directors have
breached fiduciary obligations (e.g., presence of golden
parachutes; a policy of corporate "independence" and board self-
perpetuation legitimized due to the presence of shark repellent,
or otherwise; tactical response to the tender offer with calculat-
ed, coordinated resistance; or buy-outs of bidders with "green-
mail;" etc.), and be vigilant to post hoc rationalizations that can
be developed by management and counsel, which are calculated
to place the interest of an agent (directors and/or officers) para-
mount, to the detriment (economic and otherwise) of the prin-
cipal (shareholders). These decisions of management, which
occupies a position of trust and confidence in the corporation,
should be evaluated using the standard applicable to fiduciaries,
and not by the business judgment rule.
In discussing the public policy behind holding corporate officers
and directors to the standard governing fiduciaries, the Delaware
court in Guth v. Loft, Inc. 2 , indicated the policy was "derived
from a profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives,
[and] has established a rule that demands of a corporate officer
or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous ob-
servance of his duty."276 Observing that "occasions for the deter-
mination of honesty, good faith and loyal conduct are many and
varied, and [that] no hard and fast rule can be formulated," the
court indicated the "standard of loyalty is measured by no fixed
scale." 7' Even though the judiciary, especially in Delaware, is
offering greater scrutiny of management tactics associated with
275. 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
276. Id. at 510.
277. Id.
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tender offers under the business judgment rule, a fiduciary stan-
dard would permit actions to be tested by the standard of undivided
loyalty, and obviate a result which technically meets the presump-
tions to be accorded under the business judgment rule, but which
does not support the policy of discouraging divided loyalties by
those whom the law regards as fiduciaries.
In these cases, where other than obvious self-dealing activities
are likely to develop, the author believes plaintiff-shareholders
are entitled to the presumption that a breach of management's
fiduciary duties has occurred. Management should then be enti-
tled to rebut the presumption by showing its actions were consis-
tent with modern principles of management as applied in its
particular industry, and that these decisions were based on evalu-
ations and recommendations of a board committee composed of
outside directors, whose corporations are not engaged in busi-
ness dealings with the target corporation. Once the board has es-
tablished by clear and convincing proof its justification, it should
be entitled to a jury determination of the ultimate facts. The ex-
ceptions to the rule in Dodge278 set forth in Herald79 and
Schlensky, " '° should be narrowly interpreted, and restricted to sit-
uations where officers and directors can show, by objective proof,
the primary corporate purpose and/or public interest served by
its resistance to hostile tender offers.281
The use of a committee composed of outside directors is simi-
lar to the approach used in evaluating whether a derivative suit
should be dismissed, because some directors and officers have
an "interest" in the transaction at issue. 2" However, even the use
of a "special committee" to approve of a policy of resistance to
tender offers should not be insulated from a stockholder deriva-
tive action alleging management breach of fiduciary duties in ex-
pending corporate resources to defeat a tender offer (including
payment of greenmail). Under these circumstances, this should
be categorized as a "demand not required" case, thus prohibiting
even a "special litigation committee" of "disinterested" directors
278. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
279. 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1971).
280. 95 nl. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968).
281. See supra text accompanying notes 211-14.
282. Gall v. Exxon, 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (upholding dismissal of derivative suit by a board
committee comprised of "outside directors" advised by independent, outside legal counsel).
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from dismissing the suit."8 This is appropriate, inasmuch as in
the use of defensive tactics there is likely to be an action for inju-
ry to the corporation (where the damages awarded are corporate
property), but more importantly, there is direct economic injury
to the shareholder, whose right to make a decision on whether
to tender his shares has been interfered with by the actions of tar-
get directors and officers, and any damages awarded are the
property of the shareholder.
Although it may seem harsh and detrimental to the efficient
management of the corporation that the business judgment rule
is not available to ease management's burden in the tender offer
context, such a change is required to offer the investing public
protection from agents over which it cannot realistically exercise
control. The agent is the party with the relevant information, as
well as control over the corporate proxy machine, thus enabling
it to ensure continued control. When called upon to balance the
interests of management and shareholder, the court should always
seek to balance in favor of the shareholder as principal, where
management, as agent, has abused its fiduciary relationship. This
is warranted because management remains in the best position
to manipulate its position for personal gain. This may remain un-
disclosed to the principal, if not addressed by the courts.
The derivative action is an appropriate means for the shareholder
to redress an injury to the corporation where management was
successful in its resistance to the tender offer through payment
of greenmail which increased corporate debt that exceeds appropri-
ate debt/equity ratios (as a result of defensive tactics, costs of liti-
gation, approval of golden parachute agreement, etc.). In addition,
where the tender offer was withdrawn and the shareholder lost
the opportunity to tender shares at a premium, or where the cor-
poration paid greenmail and refused, when tendered, to repur-
chase stock from the shareholder at a similar premium, the
shareholder should be entitled to pursue personal injury in a direct
action.
Where the means to accomplish the breach of fiduciary duty
are primarily by use of federal securities laws (e.g., registration
statements for securities issued under poison pill right plans, proxy
283. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 888-89 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983) (applying
Connecticut laws) ("It is in demand-not-required cases that the special litigation committee plays its role").
"MTihe wide discretion afforded directors under the business judgment rule does not apply when a special litiga-
tion committee recommends dismissal of a suit." Id at 888; see also id. at 889; Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981) ('stockholder may sue in equity in his derivative right ... without prior de-
mand upon the directors to sue, when it is apparent that a demand would be futile, that the officers are under
an influence that sterilized discretion and could not be proper persons to conduct the litigation") (quoting Mal-
donado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1262 (1980)).
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statements, issuer and third-party tender offers, etc.), and not sole-
ly the use of internal corporate machinery governed by state cor-
poration law, the author believes that the plaintiff-shareholder
should have a cause of action under federal securities laws. For
example, federal fiduciary duties have been recognized for mar-
ket professionals "8 " and in cases where there have been transac-
tions in a corporation's securities by its insiders."
In enacting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,6' Congress
determined "transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon
securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected
with a national public interest."" 7 The market for corporate con-
trol is likewise national in scope because the shareholders are geo-
graphically dispersed, and these transactions are seldom effected
without the use of the mails, interstate commerce, and/or the fa-
cilities of national securities exchanges or the automated quota-
tion system for the over-the-counter market. Thus, the author
believes there is some basis for determining that the applicable
fiduciary standard should be federal, rather than a de facto na-
tional standard as applied by those few states in which the majority
of corporate charters are granted.
Majority or Controlling Stockholders and the Sale of Control
The so-called corporate raider and another key player in any
takeover, the arbitrageur, are not held in high regard by some
commentators.. or the managers of corporations to whom they
pose a threat. Other commentators note that it is more accurate
to compare the arbitrageur favorably with the typical shareholder.
That the arbitrageurs are not interested in 'the vitality and continued existence of the corporate enter-
prise in which they have bought shares,' . . . hardly distinguishes them from the typical shareholder
284. See Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963);
Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
285. TSC Ind. Inc. v. Northways, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961).
286. 15 U.S.C. § 78a, et seq. (1982).
287. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982); see also Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 350 (1963)
(the Court in dicta recognized that in addition to establishing both the price of listed securities and affecting
prices of securities, transactions on securities exchanges "are often regarded as an indicator of our national
economic health"); Christy, supra note 25 and infra text accompanying note 316.
288. Williams, supra note 1, at 82,878. "One wonders, as a matter of fundamental fairness, whether the
interests of speculators and arbitrageurs, who move in and out of large positions with little regard to the strengths
and weaknesses of the underlying enterprise, should be the decisive factor in determining a corporation's fu-
ture." Id.
But see Swimming with the Sharks, TIME, Mar. 4, 1985, at 61:
Critics of arbitrageurs claim they make money for themselves but produce nothing of value
for the economy. While long-term stock investments help companies grow by providing them
with capital, [Ivan F.] Boesky's purchases are short-term and opportunistic. Yet he points out
the arbitrageurs help the stock market function smoothly because they are often willing to
buy a particular stock when everyone else is selling in a panic. What Boesky does has also
provided him with a personal fortune estimated at more than $150 million.
Id.
See supra notes 11,13, and 201.
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of the large publicly held corporation. Arbitrageurs, like other shareholders, buy and sell shares in
order to make a profit."'
Because the arbitrageur provides an important secondary market
for other shareholder-investors, as well as providing some sta-
bility in capital markets for publicly traded corporations, his role
should be subject to the vicissitudes of the market, rather than
through artificial means of regulation, which attempt to mimic
the market.
The tender offer shareholder, whether individual investor or
acquiring corporation, however, has a greater responsibility to
the target corporation and its remaining shareholders, and where
it has accumulated enough shares to affect control of the corpo-
ration, its duties should be analogized to that of a majority share-
holder. Several court decisions have reiterated that the fiduciary
duty of the majority shareholder to remaining shareholders of the
target corporation "exists even if the majority has a bonafide pur-
pose for eliminating the minority; in that case, the duty of the
majority is to treat the minority fairly.""o
In a class action brought by a former shareholder who challenged
elimination of the minority shareholders by a cash-out merger,
the Delaware court in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. ,29 affirmed the
rule requiring a plaintiff in a cash-out merger to "allege specific
acts of fraud, misrepresentation, or other items of misconduct to
demonstrate the unfairness of the merger terms to the minority."""
The plaintiff has the burden of proving the transaction was unfair
to the minority where the merger was approved by an "informed
vote of a majority of the minority shareholders. " 93 The court noted
it was its
limited function .. to determine whether defendants had disclosed all information in their possession
germane to the transaction in issue. And by 'germane' we mean ... information such as a reasonable
shareholder would consider important in deciding whether to sell or retain stock. Completeness, not
adequacy, is both the norm and the mandate under present circumstances.'
The record disclosed that only the Signal-designated directors on
UOP's board of directors had available a feasibility study prepared
289. Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 31, at 1183 n.60. "By doing so, they contribute to market effi-
ciency, provide a necessary check on suboptimal management, and facilitate the transfer of control to more
capable managers." Id.
290. Steinberg, supra note 61, at 228 n.184.
291. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
292. Id. at 703.
293. Id. "But in all this, the burden clearly remains on those relying on the vote to show that they complete-
ly disclosed all material facts relevant to the transaction." Id.
294. Id. at 710 (quoting Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977)) ("[Tlhe long-
existing principle of Delaware Law [is] that these Signal designated directors on UOP's board still owed UOP
and its shareholders an uncompromising duty of loyalty.").
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by two Signal-UOP directors, which used UOP data to determine
the "advantages to Signal of ousting the minority at a price range
of $21-$24 per share."' ' The court determined this report to be
material to UOP and its shareholders, thus presenting a breach
of fiduciary duty issue. " 6
Noting that one in possession of "superior knowledge may not
mislead any stockholder by use of corporate information to which
the latter is not privy,"297 the court observed Delaware also im-
poses this duty on "persons who are not corporate officers or direc-
tors, but who.., are privy to matters of interest or significance
to their company."29 Thus, the court concluded the shareholder
vote was not an "informed one," rendering "approval by a majority
of the minority . . . meaningless."' 99
Although the court approved a new appraisal remedy to benefit
injured minority shareholders, it was aware the relief may not
be appropriate in circumstances evidencing "fraud, misrepresen-
tation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross
and palpable overreaching." In such situations, the broad remedi-
al powers of the chancellor are "complete to fashion any form
of equitable and monetary relief as may be appropriate, includ-
ing recissory damages."301
The United States Supreme Court has also had occasion to ex-
amine the duty of majority - or controlling - shareholders in light
of federal securities laws. In Superintendent of Insurance of New
York v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 32 Manhattan's sole stock-
holder agreed to sell all of its Manhattan stock to Begole for $5
million. Begole conspired with others to use United States Treasury
Bonds owned by Manhattan to pay for shares. Through a decep-
tive device the bonds were sold and the proceeds used in the pur-
chase of stock. Depletion of Manhattan's assets was concealed
by purported transfer to it, in exchange for the proceeds of the
295. Id. at 708.
The Arledge-Chitiea report speaks for itself in supporting the Chancellor's finding that a price
of up to $24 was a "good investment" for Signal. It shows that a return on the investment
at $21 would be 25.7% versus 25.5% at $24 per share. This was a difference of only two-
tenths of one percent, while it meant over $17,000,000 [more] to the minority. Under such
circumstances, paying UOP's minority shareholders $24 would have had relatively little long-
term effect on Signal ....
Id. at 709.
296. Id. at 709 ("This problem occurs because there were common Signal-UOP directors participating,
at least to some extent, in the UOP board's decisionmaking processes without full disclosure of the conflicts
they faced.").
297. Id. at 711.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 712.
300. "Id. at 714.
301. Id.
302. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
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bond sale, of a certificate of deposit, which had been assigned
by Manhattan's new president, a co-conspirator, to another cor-
poration and used by it as collateral for a loan.0
In defining the duties of those whom the law regards as
fiduciaries, the Court applied § 10(b)..' to give the party injured
in the securities transaction a remedy, regardless of remedies avail-
able under applicable state law.*30 "The controlling stockholder
owes the corporation a fiduciary obligation - one 'designed for
the protection of the entire community of interests in the corpo-
ration - creditors as well as stockholders.' ""
Fiduciary Standard: Greenmail
As such, where the bidder has decided to affect a change of
control through a tender offer as a result of superior knowledge
gained about the target corporation, and is subsequently offered
a substantial premium above market to withdraw its bid ("green-
mail") by target corporation management, this author believes that
its acceptance of these repurchase terms is a breach of fiduciary
duty to treat minority shareholders fairly. If the bidder negoti-
ates a withdrawal of its effort to gain control with target manage-
ment, it is at most entitled to a premium that reflects a reasonable
valuation of its control interest and the costs inherent in the evalu-
ation of the business and managerial potential of the target cor-
poration forming the basis for the favorable recommendation and
decision to acquire the target by tender offer.3 0 This premium
is a fair cost for the corporation's remaining shareholders, since
this information, provided by the superior research capabilities
of the bidder, could become the basis for derivative and/or direct
actions against the target board for breach of fiduciary duty.0
However, in a case applying California law, a state court held
that if target management breached its fiduciary duty to stock-
303. 404 U.S. at 7-8; see id. at 10. "That the fraud was perpetrated by an officer of Manhattan and his
outside collaborators is irrelevant to our problem. For § 10(b) bans the use of any deceptive device in the
'sale' of any security by 'any person.' 
" Id.
304. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
305. 404 U.S. at 11-12.
The Congress made clear that 'disregard of trust relationships by those whom the law should
regard as fiduciaries, are all a single seamless web' along with manipulation, investor's ignor-
ance, and the like .... Hence we do not read § 10(b) as narrowly as the Court of Appeals;
it is not 'limited to preserving the integrity of the securities markets' ... though that purpose
is included. Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively.
Id.
306. 404 U.S. at 12. "We agree that Congress by § 10(b) did not seek to regulate transactions which would
constitute no more than internal corporate mismanagement." Id.
307. See supra note 212.
308. See supra note 197 and text accompanying notes 195-98.
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holders by repurchasing a dissident's shares at a "price consider-
ably above market value to enable the Disney directors to retain
control,""°9 then the selling shareholder group might have joint
liability as an aider and abettor.1
IV. ROLE OF FEDERAL REGULATION
As a result of the excesses and abuses that have been part of
the fight for corporate control by "corporate raiders" and target
management, there has been increased interest in legislation to
regulate tender offers and remove the possibility that greenmail
will become a "legitimate" business practice. The size of the cor-
porations involved and the enormous concentration of wealth and
corporate resources controlled by a relatively small number of
individuals concerns some commentators."' Communities that fear
loss of jobs, shrinking industrial tax base due to plant closings,
and other negative results from mergers and takeovers are also
an effective legislative interest group. '
The Senate considered a bill which would "restrict the practice
in corporate takeover schemes known as 'greenmail.'" The bill
[S.286] read:
[T]hat section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 783) is amended by inserting
after subsection (e) the following new subsection:
(f) It shall be unlawful for an issuer to purchase, directly or indirectly, any of its securities at a price
above the market from any person who holds more than 3 per centum of the class of the securities
to be purchased and has held such securities for less than two years, unless such purchase has been
approved by the affirmative vote of the majority of the aggregate voting securities of the issuer, or
the issuer makes an offer to acquire, of at least equal value, to all holders of securities of such class
and to all holders of any class into which such securities may be converted."'
Although in testimony before a House subcommittee a Reagan
administration official "opposed any federal legislation to inhibit
309. Heckman v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal. App. 3d 119, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177, (Ct. App. 1985).
310. Id.
311. Williams, supra note 1, at 82,882.
Under the American system, anyone who exercises power needs to be held accountable to
someone else for his stewardship. Acquisitions and tender offers are perceived correctly to
involve the exercise of considerable power - that is, the ability to influence many person's
lives and futures. Jobs, the welfare of entire communities, and indeed, the national economy
undoubtedly will be affected by these transactions. This nation cannot - and will not - allow
matters of such vital significance to be unaccountable to rational decision-makers who are act-
ing according to publicly acceptable norms.
Id.
312. Cf Official: Takeovers help economy, Clarion-Ledger, March 13, 1985, at 8B, col. 3.
It would be ironic to shackle the market for corporate control, and thereby hinder efficiency
in order to protect isolated vested interests who seek to defend the status quo, [Joseph R.]
Wright [deputy director - Office of Management and Budget] said. Corporate management
welfarism should not be promoted under the guise of saving jobs and protecting local commu-
nities against disruption.
Id.
313. 131 CONG. REc. S673-74 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985) (statement of Mr. Riegel).
314. S. 286, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. S673-74 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985).
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hostile takeovers of large companies, saying such restrictions could
promote 'corporate management welfarism [sic],' ""' in the author's
view there is a need for some legislation to prohibit greenmail,
in order to provide necessary uniformity and protection for in-
vestors in transactions occurring in the national securities market.31
Although the legislation was not enacted, even with S. 286, or
similar legislation introduced in the future,3"' one must recognize
an inherent conflict with incumbent management that will work
to develop opportunities for new, innovative means to frustrate
the intent of the Williams Act to the potential detriment of the
corporation. Therefore, the author believes it is inappropriate for
any bill to attempt to regulate repurchase of corporate stock by
permitting premiums after the bidder has held shares for a specific
minimum time period. The corporation should not in effect guaran-
tee the "greenmailer" anything. A tender offeror shareholder should
have the same privileges and risks of other shareholders, and
greenmail should be prohibited. As a result, a tender offeror share-
holder should take the risk of selling on the open market, or the
corporation (where it desires to repurchase stock) should offer
to repurchase, 3" at a given price, a specified number of shares
presented for redemption within a specified time period, on a pro
rata basis for all shares tendered. Thus, the possibility would be
significantly reduced that the "greenmailer" and the target's
management can attempt to accomplish the repurchase of the
315. See supra note 312, at 8B.
316. Cf. Christy, supra note 25, at 127-28.
[T]he state of Delaware and an unrealistic federalism have played a significant role in
hindering serious attempts at the state level to make corporate managements properly account-
able to stockholders. Delaware has been permitted to enact what is in effect a national corpo-
ration law . . . .Because the buyers in the charter market are corporate managers, not the
stockholders, Delaware's marketing program has been aimed at the corporate managers ....
The Delaware Supreme Court, however, has joined the state's marketing effort by reducing
corporate manager's duty of care and duty of loyalty to the point that managers of Delaware
corporations can negligently and intentionally mismanage almost with impunity.
Id.
But see Arsht, supra note 36, at 663. "Those who read the Business Judgment Rule as condoning conduct
less exacting than section 35 of the Model Business Corporations Act misread the Delaware cases." Id.
317. Vise, Congress May Take on Takeovers, Washington Post, Jan. 11, 1987 at G8, col. I (a bill focused
on corporate takeover reform, introduced in the 100th Congress by Senator Howard Metzenbaum, includes
an anti-greenmail provision "prohibit[ing] a corporation from buying shares from a raider at a premium over
the stock market price, if the raider owns more than 3 percent of the stock and has held the stock for less
than two years," although stockholders would have the power to waive the prohibition in specific cases with
an affirmative vote in favor of the payment).
318. However, it would not be a valid business purpose to effect repurchase for the purpose of perpetuat-
ing current management's control. To avoid the potential for greenmail effect (legally consummated by legisla-
tion similar to S. 286) to the detriment of the corporation, the repurchase program should be restricted to X%
or N quantity (whichever is less), and spread pro rata over all shares tendered, which would not allow a con-
trolling shareholder (or potential "greenmailer") to dump his holdings on the corporation, and thus have the
remaining shareholders cover his risk. See supra text accompanying notes 195-98.
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greenmailer's shares (after any minimum holding period) in much
the same manner as prior to any bill similar to S. 286. There-
fore, no repurchase program should be permitted that afforded
a majority or control shareholder an opportunity to "unload" his
shares on the corporation.
CONCLUSION
The concept of what constitutes "self-dealing" by fiduciaries in
the context of the tender offer must be realistically extended to
acknowledge the varied means by which directors and officers
are able to achieve their goals, even though these goals may not
be in the best interests of the shareholder for whose benefit the
board of directors manages the enterprise. When actions of direc-
tors and officers are challenged as a breach of fiduciary duty in
the tender offer context, the doctrine of independent legal sig-
nificance should not be recognized as justification for manage-
ment. 19 "Otherwise, the fiduciary duties of dominant or
managements stockholders would go for naught; exploitation
would become a substitute for justice, and equity would be per-
verted as an instrument for approving what it was designed to
thwart."
320
Certain forms of conduct (golden parachutes, shark repellent,
defensive tactics, and greenmail) are forms of self-dealing, which
pose an inherent conflict of interest that may result in a breach
of fiduciary duty. Courts should not evaluate this conduct by the
business judgment rule or valid business purpose rule; these stan-
dards of deference to directors and officers are inappropriate be-
cause directors and officers as fiduciaries have taken action that
places them in conflict with the interest of their principal, the share-
holder.
In Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Chenery Corp. ,321 Justice
Frankfurter indicated directors and officers "occup[ied] positions
of trust." '
But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom
is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge
these obligations? And what are the consequences of his deviation from duty?"
319. Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1036 (Del. 1979), overruled, Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (overruled requirement of a business purpose in parent-subsidiary mergers)
("[W]e find nothing magic about a 90% ownership of outstanding shares which would eliminate the fiduciary
duty owed by the majority to the minority.").
320. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 312 (1939).
321. 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
322. Id. at 85.
323. Id. at 85-86.
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In applying the fiduciary standards posited herein, courts will offer
a more certain guide for those who "occupy positions of trust"
as corporate directors and officers. Shareholders who invest in
corporations will have greater protection from economic injury
to the corporation (and a corresponding decline in share value),
as well as from loss of opportunity to tender their shares at a premi-
um during a tender offer. Where directors and officers manage
the corporation according to recognized business principles, they
will enjoy a similar measure of protection from challenges to their
decisions ("Monday-morning quarterback") based on policy dis-
putes and "20/20 hindsight" as do other professionals (physicians,
accountants, engineers, etc.)."
It is legitimate for shareholders to be able to replace inefficient
management or management perceived not to be acting in the best
interests of the corporation. In the publicly-held corporation,
management is not entitled to view itself as "owners" of the en-
terprise or to assume that it has a right to remain in control in
perpetuity. Therefore, response by incumbent officers and direc-
tors to a tender offer by defensive tactics and authorization of
greenmail in a mere effort to retain corporate control is an egre-
gious breach of fiduciary duty, and should be evaluated by a stan-
dard which reflects the status of officers and directors as corporate
fiduciaries, and not by the business judgment rule.
324. Christy, supra note 25, at 171.
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